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Introduction
The 2008 amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
have renewed public attention to the plight of persons with disabilities.
Almost two decades after the enactment of the ADA, Congress sought to
undo the damage that court-imposed "demanding standard[s] for qualify-
ing as disabled"' had inflicted on the struggle for recognition of persons
with disabilities. Directing judges to construe "the definition of disabil-
ity... in favor of broad coverage of individuals," 2 legislators dismissed the
judiciary's interpretation of disability as an individual's functional incapac-
ity that results from a medical impairment. That focus on the nature of
medical impairments, rather than on their social effects, had contradicted
the conception of disability as caused by social discrimination, not ill-
ness. 3 For instance, according to that conception, inability to walk is not a
disability; what makes it a disability is the lack of wheelchair-accessible
buildings. The 2008 ADA Amendments Act 4 assumes that changing the
statutory interpretation of the definition of disability, while leaving the def-
inition intact, will be sufficient to restore the ADA's original promise of
social opportunity and recognition for the 50 million disabled Americans.
1. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
2. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (1990) (amended
2008).
3. See Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213, 214 (2000) [hereinafter Scotch, Models] ("For over a
hundred years, disability has been defined in predominantly medical terms as a chronic
functional incapacity whose consequence was functional limitations assumed to result
from physical or mental impairment.").
4. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 112 Stat. 3553 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.). The ADA definition of disa-
bility remains basically the same as the definition in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
which defined a person with a disability as "any person who (i) [hias a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
activities, (ii) [h]as a record of such an impairment, or (iii) [i]s regarded as having such
an impairment." 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (2005). However, the ADAAA introduces a dis-
tinction in the remedies available for persons who qualify as disabled under the different
prongs of the definition by eliminating the requirement for reasonable accommodation
for plaintiffs "regarded as" disabled. See ADAAA, sec. 6(a)(1), § 501 (h). For a discus-
sion, see Stephen F. Befort, Let's Try This Again: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008
Attempts to Reinvigorate the "Regarded As" Prong of the Statutory Definition of Disability,
2010 UTAH L. REv. 993.
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The promise of empowerment and dignity has been resonating around
the world. We currently find ourselves at a critical point when domestic
and international efforts are converging in a unique moment in the strug-
gle for equality of persons with disabilities. 5 The landmark United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 6 speaks to the life
opportunities of 650 million persons with disabilities worldwide. 7 The
Convention, which came into force in May 2008,8 has been hailed as "the
highest legal manifestation and confirmation of the social model of disabil-
ity on the international stage."9 This international document has been
negotiated amid a process of reform at national and supranational levels,
which has been largely inspired by the social model. Theorized initially in
the United Kingdom as a reaction to the "tyranny of paternalism"' 0 that
characterized the charity approach to disability," the social model gained
political expression in the United States in the antidiscrimination para-
5. See Arlene S. Kanter, The Globalization of Disability Rights Law, 30 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COM. 241, 242 (2003) ("At no time in history has the confluence of domestic
and international efforts challenged lawmakers, scholars, and activists to work together
for the creation of binding international, regional, and domestic laws to protect the basic
human right of people with disabilities to dignity and equality.").
6. U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Optional Proto-
col, Dec. 13, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/61/611 (May 3, 2008).
7. See U.N. Comm'n for Social Development, Mainstreaming Disability in the Devel-
opment Agenda, 1 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.5/2008/6 (Feb. 2008).
8. G.A. Res. 63/192, 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/192 (Feb. 24, 2009). Both the Euro-
pean Community and the U.S. have become signatories to the Convention, on July 30,
2009, and March 30, 2007, respectively. For a study of the EU's role in the negotiations,
see Grainne de Burca, The EU in the Negotiation of the UN Disability Convention, 35 EUR.
L. REV. 174 (2010). Some of the Member States of the EU have already ratified the
Convention. As of August 2010, there were 146 signatories to the Convention (89 of
which also signed the Optional Protocol), of which 90 had ratified the Convention
(including 56 ratifications of the Protocol). Updates are available at http://www.un.
org/disabilities/countries.asp?navid=12&pid=166. For a study of the Convention, see
MICHAEL STEIN AND GERARD QUINN, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONS ON THE RIGHTS OF
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (forthcoming, Cambridge University Press, 2011). See also
Janet E. Lord, David Suozzi & Allyn L. Taylor, Lessons from the Experience of U.N. Con-
vention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Addressing the Democratic Deficit in
Global Health Governance, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 564 (2010).
9. Lisa Waddington, A New Era in Human Rights Protection in the European Commu-
nity: The Implications (of) the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities for the European Community 3, (Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Papers
Series, Paper No. 4, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1026581. See also Michael Ashley Stein, Future Prospects for the United Nations Con-
vention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: EUROPEAN AND SCANDINAVIAN PERSPECTIVES 17 (Gerard Quinn
& Oddn Mj6ll Arnard6ttir eds., 2009) (discussing the Convention as the first legally
enforceable UN instrument specifically directed at persons with disabilities).
10. See James F. Childress, Ensuring Care, Respect, and Fairness for the Elderly, 14
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 27, 31 (1984). ("Paternalism motivated by individual or commu-
nal benevolence, but unlimited and unconstrained by respect for autonomy, becomes
tyrannical .... "); Gareth H. Williams, Disablement and the Ideological Crisis in Health
Care, 32 Soc. SCI. MED. 517, 520 (1991).
11. See Doms ZAMES FLEISCHER AND FRIEDA ZAMES, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT:
FROM CHARITY TO CONFRONTATION 7-10 (2001) (describing the charity approach);
MICHAEL OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 19-26 (1996)
[hereinafter OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING]. One of the early social model theorists is SAAD Z.
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digm of the ADA and subsequently spread around the world by way of
transnational social movements to more than forty legal systems, 12 includ-
ing the European Union (the "EU"). t3
Approaching disability reform within this larger comparative frame-
work helps to understand its successes and failures across jurisdictions.
This Article compares disability reform in the US and the EU, specifically
the resilience of narrow, medicalized approaches to disability in judicial
interpretations in both jurisdictions. The scholarly debate about the "judi-
cial backlash"'14 in the US assumes that this phenomenon is unique to ADA
litigation. Yet a similar narrow judicial definition of disability can be
found at the EU level. The question thus arises whether these two phe-
nomena are in any way related. While one is always well advised to resist
simplistic causality claims, especially in an area as complex as disability
reform, I argue that an inquiry into the genealogy of the narrow judicial
interpretations of the definition of disability shifts the focus to the social
model itself. These narrow interpretations of disability represent, at least
in part, judges' reactions to how the normative framework of the social
model conceptualizes the relations between illness, impairment, and
discrimination.
The concept of medical impairments is especially important in this
context. Despite their centrality in the legal construction of disability,
medical impairments have remained largely under-theorized within the
social model. I suggest that the explanation has to do less with the concept
itself than with the argumentative strategy deployed by the advocates of the
model. Important here is the attempt of the disability rights movement to
de-link disability from illness as a precondition for building a strong,
NAGI, DISABILITY AND REHABILITATION: LEGAL, CLINICAL, AND SELF-CONCEPTS AND MEASURE-
MENT (1969).
12. For an analysis of the ADA's worldwide influence as a regulatory model, see
generally Theresia Degener & Gerard Quinn, A Survey of International, Comparative and
Regional Disability Law Reform, in DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY: INTERNATIONAL AND
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 10 (Mary Lou Breslin & Silvia Yee eds., 2002). See also Gerald
Quinn, Closing: Next Steps - Towards a United Nations Treaty on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, in DISABILITY RIGHTS 519 (Peter Blanck ed., 2005). In the EU, the turning
point was the Communication from the Commission on Equal Opportunities for People with
Disabilities: A European Action Plan, at 4, COM (2003) 650 final (Oct. 30, 2003) therein-
after 2003 European Action Plan] (arguing for "a new approach to disability: from seeing
people with disabilities as the passive recipients of compensation, society has come to
recognise their legitimate demands for equal rights and to realise that participation
relates directly to insertion."). The legal framework is now provided by the Directive
Establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation.
See Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 OJ. (L 303) 16.
13. Regarding terminology, I use "European Community" to refer to events or
reforms prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, except when reference to the
"European Union" is doctrinally warranted under the relevant Treaty provisions then in
effect. I use "European Union" to refer to the present and future legal framework and/or
policies.
14. See generally BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS
(Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003).
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shared political consciousness. 15 Analogies between impairments and ill-
ness were perceived as legitimizing medical expertise and thus perpetuat-
ing socially disabling assumptions about the standard of "normality., 1 6
However, the de-linking distorted the translation of the insights of the
social model into public policy and legal claims in both jurisdictions stud-
ied here. The lack of a theory of medical impairments had the effect of
alienating judges who needed guidance on how to interpret and apply disa-
bility statutes. Without sufficient help in the uncharted waters of the dis-
crimination-centered social model, judges (re)turned to a familiar
approach-the medicalized conception of impairments-that allowed them
to craft manageable standards and filter out what they perceived as abusive
claims. The resilience of the medicalized approaches to disability in judi-
cial interpretations, as a common phenomenon in the US and the EU, is
partly the consequence of a convergence in the reaction of courts faced
with institutional and administrability concerns and the strategy of the
social model to unify the base of the disability rights movement. I offer
this as an explanation, not a justification, of the judiciary's narrow inter-
pretations. The shift from explanatory to normative approaches rests on
theories of the judicial role that are themselves open to dispute. According
to one such theory, which I endorse, the judiciary's narrow interpretations
represent a failure to respond appropriately to the claims to recognition of
persons with disabilities.
Implied in the claim presented in this Article is the importance of one
idea-the social model-in the comparative study of disability regulation in
Europe and the United States. While other scholars have shown that con-
flicting legal strategies in the struggle for equality of persons with disabili-
15. See Richard K. Scotch, Disability as a Basis for a Social Movement: Advocacy and
the Politics of Definition, 44 J. Soc. ISSUES 159, 163 (1988) [hereinafter Scotch, Social
Movement] ("'[D]isability' as a unifying concept that includes people with a wide range
of physical and mental impairments is by no means an obvious category. Blind people,
people with orthopedic impairments, and people with epilepsy may not inherently see
themselves or be seen by others as occupying common ground. Even greater divisions
may exist between people with physical impairments and those with mental disabilities.
Thus another prerequisite for collective action may be the social construction and pro-
mulgation of an inclusive definition of disability.") This explains in part the different
tracks of the struggle for recognition and/or action/inaction of persons with disabilities.
See, e.g., Daniela Caruso, Autism in the US: Social Movement and Legal Change, 36 Am.
J.L. & MED. 483 (2010). There are difficulties inherent in the effort of defining disabil-
ity. See Thomas F. Burke, The European Union and the Diffusion of Disability Rights, in
TRANSATLANTIC POLICYMAKING IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY: DIVERSITY AND DRIFT 158, 160
(Martin A. Levin & Martin Shapiro eds., 2004) (arguing that "there are seemingly as
many definitions [of disability] as there are disabilities"). The Supreme Court of Canada
recognized the same point in Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education (1997) 1 SCR
241 at 5 ("Disability, as a prohibited ground, differs from other enumerated grounds
such as race or sex because there is no individual variation with respect to these
grounds. Disability means vastly different things, however, depending upon the individ-
ual and the context.") In the EU context, see the decision of the European Court of
Justice in Case C-13/05, Chac6n Navas v. Eurest Colectividades, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467.
For detailed discussion, see infra Part II.A.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 308-318.
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ties are rooted in contradictions of the disability rights movement,' 7 this
Article traces the conflict one important step further, in the direction of the
social model itself. At the core of the model, one finds both a transforma-
tive insight and its central shortcoming. The insight is that the cause of
disability is not a medical impairment but society's reaction to that impair-
ment. Over the past four decades, this insight has formed the basis of disa-
bility reforms and changed the status of persons with disabilities from
passive "objects of rehabilitation and cure"'18 to rights holders entitled to
make demands on social institutions. The shortcoming, as we have seen, is
the readiness to gloss over medical impairments altogether, and in this pro-
cess, to generate distortion effects that courts have been unwilling or una-
ble to rectify.
The Article is divided into four Parts. Part I uses the framework of
social systems theory as a heuristic device to study how the social model of
disability traveled back and forth between the United States and the supra-
national level in Europe. 19 According to this theory, social systems are
structurally autonomous systems. Like cells, these systems translate into
their unique "code" the information they receive from the outside environ-
ment. The social model traveled from the UK to the U.S. where, under the
influence of a rights-centered legal and political discourse, it was translated
into antidiscrimination "code" in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
17. Recent disability law scholarship that discusses the social model rarely ques-
tions its central tenets. See Adam M. Samaha, What Good Is the Social Model of Disabil-
ity?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (2007) (arguing that the social model by itself
provides insufficient guidance for social policies for persons with disabilities); Samuel
R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2004) [hereinafter Bagen-
stos, Disability Rights] (arguing that the antidiscrimination model is insufficient and that
the solution to problems of persons with disabilities requires "more than simply mandat-
ing that individual employers cease discriminating and provide accommodations; they
require direct and sustained government interventions such as the public funding and
provision of benefits. In short, the future of disability law lies as much in social welfare
law as in antidiscrimination law."); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Back-
lash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 476, 501 (2000) [hereinafter Krieger, Afterword]
("few people outside of [a] relatively small circle, including the federal judges empow-
ered to interpret the ADA, understand the social model of disability or adhere to the
norms, values, and interpretative perspectives it was designed to advance."). But see
David A. Weisbach, Toward a New Approach to Disability Law, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 47,
64-71 (critically discussing some tenets of the social model).
18. Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law:
What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91,
94 (2000).
19. My use of social systems theory is heuristic in the sense of assuming elements
that are not supported by the theory as formulated in its canonical statements. See, e.g.,
NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW As A SOCIAL SYSTEM (2004); N1KLAs LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS
(1995); Gunther Teubner, David Schiff & Richard Nobles, The Autonomy of Law: Intro-
duction to Legal Autopoiesis, in JURISPRUDENCE (David Schiff & Richard Nobles eds.,
2003). For instance, my analogy assumes without more that legal systems are social
systems and that the "code" of a system can change over time without endangering the
autonomy of the given social system.
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1973 and, later, in the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act. 20 Transna-
tional social movements, which had been largely unsuccessful at the
national level in Europe, 21 resorted to the American rights-centered version
of the social model as inspiration for legislation at the Community level. 22
This influence took the form of specific legal transplants, such as the duty
of employers to provide reasonable accommodation to persons with disa-
bilities, as well as a larger antidiscrimination approach to justiciable rights.
However, the European system's "code" required that, in the course of
implementing the model, rights be supplemented with broader welfare and
social policies for "mainstreaming"23 persons with disabilities in social life.
The more holistic approach that European regulations have taken in recent
years is now generating a new round of cross-systemic influence. 24 It has
recently become a source of inspiration for American scholars and activists
who argue that the U.S. should move beyond disability civil rights. 25 This
Part shows how successive acculturations in different political and legal
cultures added new layers of meaning to the social model of disability but
did not alter its core conception of illness, impairment, and discrimination.
This conclusion is noteworthy also from the perspective of methodological
20. See Anne Waldschmidt, Disability Policy of the European Union: The Supranational
Level, 3 EUR. J. OF DISABILITY RES. 8, 16-18 (2009) (discussing alternative ways of peri-
odization of disability rights in the EU).
21. At the time, only three national systems - the UK, Ireland, and Sweden - had
laws protecting from discrimination on grounds of disability. See infra text accompany-
ing note 124.
22. See Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 OJ. (L 303) 16.
23. Language also has its own code. See Commission Staff Working Paper: Disability
Mainstreaming in the European Employment Strategy, at 3, COM (2005) EMCO/11/
290605 (Jul. 1, 2005) (stating that "[m]ainstreaming means that the needs of disadvan-
taged people need to be taken into account in the design of all policies and measures,
and that action for disadvantaged people is not limited to those policies and measures
which are specifically addressing their needs.").
24. American scholars and activists have expressed dissatisfaction with the Ameri-
can rights-centered model and drawn inspiration from European social model regula-
tions. See SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 136 (2009) (arguing that "disability rights activists must move beyond
antidiscrimination law to embrace social welfare interventions if they are to achieve the
goals of employment and integration into community life"). For a recent description of
the comprehensive EU disability policy, see Commission Communication: European Disa-
bility Strategy 2010-2020, at 5-10, COM (2010) 636 final (Nov. 15, 2010) [hereinafter
2010 EC Disability Strategy] (identifying the following areas of action: accessibility, par-
ticipation, equality, employment, education and training, social protection, health, and
external action).
25. See, e.g., Michael Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond Disability Civil
Rights, 58 HAS-LNGS L.J. 1203, 1205 (2007) (advocating a disability human rights para-
digm that combines ADA-type civil and political rights with "the full spectrum" of social,
cultural, and economic measures); Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the
Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 23 (2000) (arguing that "[a]lthough
there are many advantages to framing the issue as a matter of civil rights, in some ways
the civil rights model is not an ideal fit with the problems posed by the issue of disabil-
ity."). For a general comparative analysis between Europe and the U.S. on general
antidiscrimination regimes, see generally Katerina Linos, Path Dependence in Discrimina-
tion Law: Employment Cases in the United States and the European Union, 35 YALE J. INT'L
L. 115 (2010).
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debates in comparative law. Legal ideas do not dissolve in the larger cul-
tural, institutional, or ideological context when they migrate across differ-
ent systems. Comparative legal studies should combine the normativity of
legal projects and ideas and the richness and diversity of their broader
social, historical, and cultural contexts.2 6
The genealogy and migration pattern of the social model illuminate
otherwise puzzling similarities between narrow judicial definitions of disa-
bility across the two jurisdictions studied here. Part II identifies these simi-
larities. Although scholars have amply documented the decisions of
American courts, 2 7 those of other courts have received less emphasis.
When asked to define disability, in the context of whether illness was cov-
ered under the European directive governing disability discrimination, the
European Court of Justice (the EU's apical judicial body28 ) answered that it
was not and then supplied a narrow, medicalized definition of disability as
"a limitation which results in particular from physical, mental or psycho-
logical impairments and which hinders the participation of the person
concerned in professional life."'2 9 This article examines solely the ECJ, but
there is evidence to support its conclusions in other jurisdictions, such as
the UK30 and Germany.3 1 Despite different background conceptions
26. For a learned argument that comparative law should overcome that uneasiness,
see James Q. Whitman, The Neo-Romantic Turn, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADI-
TIONS AND TRANSITIONS 312, 343-344 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003).
For a recent argument about the transformation of legal culture(s) within the European
Union in the direction of adversarial legalism, as a consequence of European integration,
see R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW AND REGULATION IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011).
27. One study of ADA cases found that employer-defendants won in 92 percent of all
cases brought during the 1990s. See Am. Bar Ass'n, Study Finds Employers Win Most
ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 403, 403 (1998). The Supreme Court has decided five cases addressing the defini-
tion of disability: Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) ; Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999);
Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). For discussion, see infra Part I.B.
28. A note is in order regarding terminology. As of the entry into force of the Treaty
of Lisbon, the European Court of Justice has been officially renamed the "Court of Jus-
tice." In this comparative study, I will continue to refer to the Court by its traditional
name of the European Court of Justice.
29. Chac6n Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, '1 43.
30. In the UK, one study found that one of the statistically significant influences on
the chances of a plaintiff prevailing was the nature of the disability. "[Aipplicants with
physical or mobility problems were least likely to succeed, and those with sensory
impairments or internal organ problems most likely to." DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION
AND EMPLOYMENT, REPORT, MONITORING THE DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION ACT 1995 126
(1999). For a recent example, see London Borough of Lewisham v. Malcom [2008]
UKHL 43 (appeal taken from Eng.). The case is discussed in Rachel Horton, The End of
Disability-Related Discrimination in Employment?, 37 INDUS. L.J. 376 (2008).
31. See generally Katharina C. Heyer, The ADA on the Road: Disability Rights in Ger-
many, 27 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 723 (2002). As always in comparative analysis, one must
proceed with caution. For a nuanced and normatively rich approach to comparative
analysis, with particular focus on labor law, see Thomas C. Kohler, The Disintegration of
Labor Law: Some Notes for a Comparative Study of Legal Transformation, 73 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1311 (1998).
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about rights, the state, and the proper institutional role of courts, one can
find narrow judicial interpretations of disability in disability discrimina-
tion across jurisdictions. Why are courts prone to remaining tied to the
medicalized understanding of disability, despite the legislative shift
towards the social model?
Part III finds explanations first articulated in the American context
and tests them in the European mirror. I divide the explanations into two
categories: explanations endogenous and exogenous to legal reasoning.
The former category includes doctrinal accounts that point to the courts'
textualist methodology, and finally, jurisprudential explanations that place
disability discrimination within the larger context of the jurisprudence of
equality. Explanations in the latter category trace the resilience of the
medicalized approach to ideological factors (the role of both the market
and social factors in the discourse of disability reform), sociological factors
(the composition of the judiciary), and/or institutional factors (both inter-
institutional, between the legislature and the judiciary, as well as intra-
institutional, within the judiciary). This Part concludes that these factors
are insufficient to explain the staying power of the medicalized approach in
the judicial definitions of disability.
Part IV finds the missing explanation in the social model itself, specifi-
cally in constitutive tensions at the core of the social model. The social
model has been a variable largely absent from studies of the "judicial back-
lash,"3 2 but a comparative approach brings it back to the forefront. Identi-
fying the social model itself as the missing explanation for the staying
power of the medicalized approach to disability has mixed implications.
The good news is that, formally speaking, changes in the judicial definition
of disability would go a long way to change the current disability law
regime. Defining disability without reference to medical impairments
would bring courts closer to a discrimination-centered approach to disabil-
ity. 33 The bad news is that an impairment-free definition is highly
unlikely. There is a path dependency in how concepts are defined, and
medical impairments have so often been at the center of the meaning of
disability that it might be difficult to shift course radically at this stage.
However one envisions the future of disability law, it helps to understand
the judicial definition of disability as reflecting deep tensions in the argu-
ments and argumentative strategies in support of the social model. This
last Part concludes with recommendations de lege ferenda.
32. See generally Krieger, supra note 14.
33. Even the boldest proposals for amending the ADA, which sought a formal
change in the statutory provisions on the meaning of disability, would have defined
disability by reference to "actual, past, or perceived physical or mental impairment."
National Council of Independent Living, Major Progress on ADA Restoration: A Potential
Deal with the Business Community, http://www.ncil.org/news/ADARADeal2.html.
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I. From the Body to the Body Politic: The Transformation of
Disability Law in the United States and the European Union
My main aim in this Part is to present a comparative history of disabil-
ity law in the United States and the European Union over the past four
decades. While following different paths, the evolution of the disability
regimes in these two jurisdictions has also been synchronized. This syn-
chronization is the result of the social model of disability, whose propo-
nents theorized the need for reform and provided the necessary normative
framework. The model was first fully theorized in the United Kingdom
and reached political influence in the United States with the enactment in
1990 of the ADA, which in turn inspired transnational social movements to
lobby for changes in disability legislation in Europe.
Social systems theory is useful, at least partly, as a descriptive frame-
work for how the social model traveled back and forth between the United
States and Europe. According to that theory, social systems are structurally
autonomous systems that translate into their unique codes the information
they receive from the environment. 34 This Part analogizes legal systems
with social systems and conceptualizes the social model of disability as the
normative message that travels back and forth across the Atlantic. At the
first stage, the rights-centered American legal discourse translates the basic
insights of the social model into antidiscrimination "code." The model
then enters European supranational institutions and discourse, which
place antidiscrimination rights within a larger, more comprehensive frame-
work of welfare and social policies that represents Europe's own "code."
Dissatisfied with the results of the antidiscrimination model, American dis-
ability scholars and advocates have recently started looking towards the
European expression of the social model.
A. Politics of the Body Disabled: The Medicalized Model in the
European Community (1970s to 1996)
The founding treaty of the European Economic Community, signed in
Rome in 1957, envisioned the creation of an internal market among its
signatories. 35 The subject matter of the Rome Treaty closely matched its
goals. The treaty established mutual duties on the part of Member States
to lift trade barriers and free the circulation of goods, services, persons,
and capital. 36 Over the next half century, the internal market expanded
dramatically both in size, from six to twenty-seven Member States, as well
as in institutional complexity. 3 7 These developments called for periodic
34. As mentioned in the introduction, my use of social systems theory is heuristic.
See supra text accompanying note 19.
35. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, art. 2 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. The European Economic Community
postdated the creation of a more specialized European Coal and Steel Community. See
The Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140.
36. Treaty of Rome, supra note 35, arts. 28-30, 39(1).
37. From six initial signatories (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, and
Luxembourg), membership in the Union grew to 27 states. For a study of the early devel-
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revisions of the founding treaty.38 In addition to the necessary institu-
tional reforms, revisions significantly expanded the Community's compe-
tencies vis-d-vis Member States. New areas of supranational competence
included environmental protection, employment, telecommunications,
monetary policy, human rights, justice affairs, and other areas.39 All
along, however, the Community remained one of limited and enumerated
powers. Member States remained sovereign over subject-matter jurisdic-
tions (such as defense, foreign affairs, and health and social policy) that
they had neither implicitly nor explicitly transferred to the Community.
40
It was not until 1999, when the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force, that
the Community acquired the legal basis to pass binding measures regard-
ing the treatment of persons with disabilities across its territory.
4 1
Lack of formal competencies does not mean that the Community had
no initiatives in this area before the very end of the 20th century. Indeed,
for two decades after the mid-'70s, the Community had put forth disability
policies under the legal framework in place at the time. The earliest policy
documents show the Community's concern to mitigate the social effects of
medical impairments on persons with disabilities by carving out for them
separate, parallel social tracks.42 For instance, in the employment context,
the policy aimed at their "rehabilitation into vocational life or, where
appropriate, by placing them in sheltered industries."4 3 Such policies of
opment of the Community's institutional framework, seeJ. H. H. Weiler, The Transforma-
tion of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991).
38. For an introductory discussion of the constitutive treaties from The Treaty of
Rome (1957) to The Treaty of Nice (2001), see DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION
LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 8-43 (2006). The most recent rearrangement of the Union's
institutional structure occurred when the Treaty of Lisbon came into effect in December
2009. For a brief overview of its provisions, see Paul Craig, The Treaty of Lisbon: Process,
Architecture and Substance, 33 EUR. L. REV. 137, 137-166 (2008).
39. See CHALMERS, supra note 38, at 12.
40. See id. at 11. Despite the Community's numerous transgressions of its limited
competency, the first time the European Court of Justice invalidated a Community act as
ultra vires was Directive 1998/43/EC (banning most forms of tobacco advertisement
across the Community). See Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council, 2000
E.C.R. 1-8419. For an analysis of the subsequent tobacco litigation, see Fernanda Nicola
& Fabio Marchetti, Constitutionalizing Tobacco: The Ambivalence of European Federalism,
46 HARVARD INT'L LJ. 507 (2005).
41. See Treaty of Amsterdam, Oct. 2, 1997, art. 6a, 1997 OJ. (C 340) 1. ("Without
prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the limits of the powers con-
ferred by it upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from
the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate
action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief,
disability, age or sexual orientation.").
42. See e.g., Council Resolution Concerning a Social Action Programme (EC) No.
12/02/1974 of 21 January 1974, art. 7, 1974 OJ. (C 013). The separate parallel track
that provides income and services apart from institutions that serve the non-disabled
majority characterizes the approach of the social welfare model of disability. See Lisa
Waddington & Matthew Diller, Tensions and Coherence in Disability Policy: The Uneasy
Relationship Between Social Welfare and Civil Rights Models of Disability in American, Euro-
pean and International Employment Law, in DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY: INTERNA-
TIONAL AND NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 241, 244 (Mary Lou Breslin & Silvia Yee eds., 2002).
43. Council Resolution Concerning a Social Action Programme (EC) of 21 January
1974, art. 7, 1974 O.J. (C 013).
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segregation assumed the existence of an unbridgeable gap between the
social capabilities of disabled persons and those of a (non-disabled) major-
ity. Persons with disabilities were perceived as being in need of "rehabilita-
tion," though not necessarily entitled to it. 4 4 By imposing itself on both
social groups at the national level, the scheme created and reinforced spe-
cific (self-) understandings of social groups: one formed by the passive
beneficiaries of "rehabilitation" policies and the other by charitable,
"abled" citizens. This social scheme constituting the foundations of the
medical model of disability bred an inevitable-and unmistakable-pater-
nalism that informed the policies of national governments, which
remained during this period the exclusive agents of rehabilitative action.45
Expressions of paternalism also found their way into the Community's
early policies and sometimes even into official documents.4 6
Lacking the legal basis for the enactment of binding laws, the Commu-
nity acted at the early stage through soft law measures.4 7 Some of those
measures aimed, and succeeded, in creating a common institutional frame-
work in which national officials in charge of disability policies could
exchange information and in this process learn from each other's exper-
iences. But the framework also had perverse effects. First, it reinforced the
presuppositions of the medical model that shaped the social policy of the
Member States. Second, it failed to "socialize" those states into opening up
their disability policies to the Community's outside scrutiny with bite.
Member States proved willing to join in the Community's information
exchange networks as long as the costs of participation were low to nonex-
istent.48 But as soon as the Community tried to "harden" its soft measures,
for instance by enabling its institutions to follow through with the national
implementation of goals in areas such as employment, the Member States
were quick to exercise their veto powers. 49 Similarly, attempts to pass sec-
44. See Rachel Hurst, The International Disability Rights Movement and the ICF, 25
DISABILITY & REHABILITATION 572, 572 (2003).
45. See LISA WADDINGTON, DISABILITY, EMPLOYMENT AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 21
(1995) [hereinafter WADDINGTON, DISABILITY, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY].
46. See, e.g., Council Resolution Establishing the Initial Community Action Pro-
gramme for the Vocational Rehabilitation of Handicapped Persons (EC) of 27 June 1974,
1974 OJ. (C 80) 30, ("The general aim of Community efforts on behalf of the handi-
capped must be to help these people to become capable of leading a normal independent
life fully integrated into society."). See also WADDINGTON, DISABILITY, EMPLOYMENT, AND
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 45, at 100 ("the [1974 action program] speaks of
the need to 'help these people,' rather than to 'enable' disabled people to help them-
selves. Furthermore, no reference is made to the need to consult disabled people on a
wide scale, and encourage their participation in the formulation and implementation of
policy.").
47. Soft law measures are legal rules that do not have binding character. For a gen-
eral discussion, see LINDA SENDEN, SOFT LAW IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (2004).
48. One such example is the creation of the European Network of Rehabilitation
Centers. See WADDINGTON, DISABILITY, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,
supra note 45, at 99.
49. See LISA WADDINGTON, FROM ROME TO NICE IN A WHEELCHAIR: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF A EUROPEAN DISABILITY POLICY 6-7 (2006) [hereinafter WADDINGTON, FROM ROME TO
NICE].
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ondary legislation in areas such as transportation of persons with disabili-
ties were also unsuccessful. 50 As one commentator summed it up, the
overall impact of disability-specific initiatives was "minimal.
5 1
There are a number of possible explanations for the reluctance of
Member States to commit themselves to enhanced cooperation in this area
during that period. First, national governments were keen to protect their
turf vis-A-vis Community encroachment in subject matters such as health
policy and social security. Second, since implementation of disability pol-
icy can be expensive, national governments were unwilling to submit them-
selves voluntarily to supranational control with significant financial
implications. Third, disability policy never became a priority to any power-
ful stakeholders and thus could not be the object of grand political bargain-
ing. All three explanations point to disability policy falling outside the
hard economic core of the Community project. But one can also interpret
these explanations as flowing from the political implications of the medical
model itself. When disability is understood as the effect of medical impair-
ments, rather than as the effect of social arrangements, there is limited
payoff to investing scarce political capital into disability policy.
For all their limited success, these early programs had one long-lasting
impact that eventually shaped the future of disability policy in Europe.
These programs provided the institutional framework and secured funding
for the continuing existence of the European Disability Forum (the "EDF")
as an umbrella organization at the Community level of the national disabil-
ity rights movements.9 2 In a strategy typical of the European Commis-
sion's general template of entanglement with social movements, the
creation of the EDF was in part the Commission's political attempt to
bypass rigid national governments and bureaucracies by reaching out
directly to stakeholders-in this case, the disability rights movement.
Moreover, Community funding guaranteed that the Commission would
have influence over the EDF's political choreography. Thus, the Commis-
sion not only gained an important ally but also secured control over that
50. See, e.g., Comm'n Proposal for a Council Directive on Minimum Requirements to
Improve the Mobility and the Safe Transport to Work of Workers with Reduced Mobility,
COM (1991) 558 final (Feb. 28, 1991); WADDINGTON, FROM ROME TO NICE, supra note
49, at 7-8.
51. See WADDINGTON, FROM ROME To NICE, supra note 49, at 11 ("This was especially
true of the policy initiatives. Member States were reluctant to accept binding obligations
at [that] time, and unwilling to comply with recommendations requiring concrete
changes."); see also WADDINGTON, DISABILITY, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY, supra note 45. In his recent work, Daniel Kelemen points to failures of this type in
arguing against descriptive claims about European integration through soft law. See
KELEMEN, supra note 26, at 29-32.
52. See Christine Quittkat & Barbara Finke, The EU Commission Consultation
Regime, in OPENING EU-GOVERNANCE TO CIVIL SOCIETY: GAINS AND CHALLENGES 194, 201
(Beate Kohler-Koch, Dirk De Bivre & William Maloney eds., 2008). The EDF, which
was created with funds from the Helios II program, continues to be very active. See
WADDINGTON, FROM ROME TO NIcE, supra note 49, at 18; The European Disability Forum,
http://www.edf-feph.org/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).
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ally's political activities. 53 The impact of the EDF in the next decades,
often in the form of effective advocacy for American-type rights-based
antidiscrimination, cannot be overstated. Its policy papers produced in the
early 1990s, which advocated that discrimination should be expanded
from race and gender to include disability, prepared the ground for the
transformation of Community disability policy in the late 1990s. 54
B. Discovering the Body Politic: The Antidiscrimination Model in the
United States
Since the end of the First World War, federal statutes in the United
States concerning persons with disabilities focused mainly on vocational
training and social security protection. Disability advocacy started in the
1960s on student campuses such as U.C. Berkeley, spurred by students
with disabilities for whom educational opportunities had only recently
become available. The early campaigns were successful in creating campus
accommodation followed in due course, and with federal funding,5 5 by the
organization of a parallel program for nonstudents. Coordinated by per-
sons with disabilities, these centers for independent living ("CIL"), the first
of which was incorporated in 1972, took a holistic approach to the ques-
tion of social integration. 56 They gained visibility among disability advo-
cates both nationally and transnationally. During this time, disability
advocates from Europe would visit the CIL regularly to draw inspiration for
how to fight their battles at home more successfully. 57 However, the rela-
tive insularity of the CIL meant that their advocacy was insufficient to gen-
erate a broad social movement capable of putting disability policy on the
political agenda. As one looks for the causes of the early disability reforms
in the second half of the twentieth century, one will not find an outside
social movement exerting pressure on the state. Rather, during that time,
53. The alliance paid off, at least in the short run. Indeed, only recently has the EDF
spoken out against the Commission's disability policies. See Open Letter to Jose Manuel
Barroso, President of the European Commission, (2009), available at http://www.edf-
feph.org/PageGenerale.asp?DocID=17951&thebloc=22810 (last visited Feb. 11, 2010)
(arguing strongly for a comprehensive disability-only directive and noting that civil soci-
ety had not been consulted on the Commission's proposal for a new anti-discrimination
directive).
54. See Commission Communication on Equality of Opportunity for People With Disa-
bilities: A New European Community Disability Strategy, COM (1996) 406 final (Jul. 30,
1996) [hereinafter 1996 EC Disability Strategy].
55. JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PiTY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 50, 53 (1993).
56. Id. at 53-58.
57. See Heyer, supra note 31, at 736 (describing the "the love affair" between the
German disability groups and the American disability advocates). "Many German disa-
bility groups travelled to the United States to learn about the movement there and
returned full of enthusiasm and optimism about what might be possible with a para-
digm shift from charity and dependence to equal rights and self-determination. It is safe
to say that all the leading figures in Germany's movement today have made at least one
trip to the United States, most commonly to Berkeley." Id. at 734.
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"the social movement was in the government."5 8
In the early 1970s, after failed attempts to list disability as a prohibited
ground for discrimination alongside race or national origin in Title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act,5 9 Congress included a provision in the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973 (regarding federal aid for vocational training) mandating
that "[njo otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United
States ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from partici-
pation in, be denied the benefit of, or be subject to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."60 The
inclusion of this provision, which became Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, was not a response to societal pressure, but rather it was the outcome
of what one commentator aptly calls "anticipatory politics." 6 1 Specifically,
it reflected the views of government insiders-in particular Congressional
staffers-who came to see persons with disabilities as a minority group
engaged in a struggle for recognition similar to that of the civil rights and
the women's movements.
Because the Rehabilitation Act covered an array of fields ranging from
education to transportation, as well as any other federally-run or federally-
funded program, it became necessary to define the meaning of "handi-
capped individual" for the purpose of section 504.62 It was at this critical
moment that the perspective shifted in a quasi-official way from medical
impairment to a political focus on issues of societal discrimination. 63 The
term "handicapped individual" was interpreted to refer to "any person who
(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment. '64 This
58. JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION 269 (2002); see also RICH-
ARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABILITY
POLICY 41-43 (2001).
59. SKRENTNY, supra note 58, at 268 (arguing that the attempt to amend Title VI
failed due to the timing of the legislative proposal). Cf. Burke, supra note 15, at 162
(arguing that the failure was due to fear of opening up the Act or the distinctiveness of
disability from the other grounds listed in the Act).
60. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, codified at 29 U.S.C. 701, et seq; 29 U.S.C.
§ 794. The language of the provision was almost identical with that in Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which applied to
sex discrimination.
61. SKRENTNY, supra note 58, at 270 (describing how the staffers anticipated that the
disabled would want what they were given); see id. at 269.
62. The Rehabilitation Act was not the first act applying to "handicapped persons."
See Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121 (1970) (mandat-
ing, for the first time, that children with disabilities were entitled to receive free and
appropriate public education).
63. Some observers credit the lawyers in the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare with this shift. See Feldblum, supra note 18, at 99-100 (describing how, under
the social model, "it was myths, fears and stereotypes about people with disabilities that
often hampered such individuals' involvement and advancement in society, not the
objective reality of any impact their physical or mental impairment had on their ability
to function, perform, or contribute to society.").
64. H.R. 17503, 93rd Cong. 2nd Sess. (1974) (codified at 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2
(2005)).
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definition would prove more resilient over the following decade than many
could have predicted. The definition was later incorporated into the ADA
and retained in the ADAAA. It is a definition that shares the assumptions
of the social model in its second and third prongs, and arguably in the first
prong as well. As one commentator noted, "[elven people whose condi-
tions have no ongoing medical significance may experience the prejudice,
stereotypes, and neglect that make up disability-based disadvantage ...
[t]hat is the basic insight reflected in the 'regarded as' and 'record'
prongs."65
This basic insight turned out to have unpalatable political conse-
quences. However close the analogy between discrimination on the basis
of disability and discrimination on the grounds of race or gender, that
analogy dissipated as soon as the costs of implementing the former mea-
sures became apparent. It is one thing to force universities that benefit
from federal funding to stop discriminating on the basis of race, but it is
quite another to make them provide reasonable accommodation for stu-
dents with disabilities. Confronted with such costs, the executive branch
would have delayed sine die the issuing of implementation regulations if it
were not for the pressure of outside disability groups that by then had
begun building up their strength. Organizing that pressure marked "the
political coming of age of the disability rights movement, '66 as the move-
ment succeeded in getting a reluctant Carter administration to allocate the
necessary resources and issue the implementation regulations of Section
504 four years after its enactment.67 The shared legal imaginary of mod-
ern struggles for recognition is also noteworthy. The rhetoric that galva-
nized the disability rights movement borrowed heavily from the civil rights
movement: protesters framed their opposition to "separate but equal facili-
ties" and celebrated their success against the administration with chants of
"We Have Overcome."'68
Once the implementation regulations were in place and Section 504
was in effect, discrimination against the disabled was shown to be "nearly
everywhere." 6 9 Its roots were so deep and its forms of manifestation so
diverse and far reaching that the Rehabilitation Act, which applied solely to
federal or federally-funded entities, was soon perceived as insufficient in
65. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability", 86 VA. L. REV. 397,
470 (2000) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Subordination].
66. SHAPIRO, supra note 55, at 68.
67. For the story of the sit-in in the San Francisco regional office of the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare, see id. at 68-69.
68. See id.; see also Richard K. Scotch, Politics and Policy in the History of the Disability
Rights Movement, 67 MILBANK Q. 380, 386 (1989) (hereinafter Scotch, Politics and Policy]
("The shape of the disability rights movement and perhaps its very existence has been
the result of available models of these other movements, which have provided examples
of political action and ideological frameworks, and which also served as sources of
cooperation and competition."). This is not an exclusively American phenomenon. For
similar cross-influences in the Canadian context, see Lisa Vanhala, Twenty-five Years of
Disability Equality? Interpreting Disability Rights in the Supreme Court of Canada, 39 COM-
MON L. WORLD REv. 27, 31 (2010).
69. SKRENTNY, supra note 58, at 273.
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rooting out discrimination against persons with disabilities. The perceived
necessity for comprehensive legislation that transcended the federal/non-
federal divide by granting rights enforceable in courts provided the move-
ment's rallying cry. As one commentator pointed out, "[d]espite the
extraordinary diversity of the community of people with disabilities, disa-
bility groups held together largely on the need for a rights law."70 The
legacy of previous struggles for recognition, with their demands for
enforceable rights, as well as the relatively thorough job of the judiciary
applying Section 504, explain the calls during the 1980s for comprehensive
rights-based legislation.7 1
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 answered that call. The
Act covered a wide range of areas and social services, from employment to
public transportation, private accommodations, and means of communica-
tion.72 The ADA required any employer with more than 15 employees to
provide "reasonable accommodation" to persons with disabilities, provided
the accommodation would not be an "undue hardship"; private employers'
failure to provide reasonable accommodation constituted discrimination.
7 3
Under the new regime, the ADA created a cause of action in federal courts
for employees seeking redress.74 This horizontal spread of disability pro-
tections is unsurprising from the perspective of the social model. The leg-
islative findings incorporated into the statute reflect that model's
conceptual apparatus by noting that "historically, society has tended to iso-
late and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improve-
ments, such forms of disability continue to be a serious and pervasive
social problem." 75 At the same time, enforceable rights are the main tool in
70. Burke, supra note 15, at 163.
71. The social movement had grown stronger and more influential by 1990 when the
ADA was enacted. Some scholars have argued, however, that the movement still lacked
visibility and hence that it might not have been in a position to defend the Act's applica-
tion. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword - Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary
Perspective and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1,
11 (2000) [hereinafter Krieger, Foreword].
72. See Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et
seq.).
73. ADA Title 1, 42 U.S.C. §§12111 (5), (9), (10); 12112(b)(5)(a). A similar stance
would be taken by the 2006 UN Convention, which is reminiscent of the EU position.
See Commission Staff Working Paper: Disability Mainstreaming in the European Employ-
ment Strategy, at 3, COM (2005) EMCO/11/290605 Uul. 1, 2005) ("Failure to provide
reasonable accommodation in the workplace can constitute discrimination . . .
[r]easonable accommodation is not a positive action left to the discretion of public and
private operators, but an obligation whose failure can constitute unfair
discrimination.").
74. ADA Title I, 42 U.S.C. §12117(a).
75. Id. § 12101(a)(2). See also ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,
112 Stat. 3553 § 2, (a)(2) ("in enacting the ADA, Congress recognized that physical and
mental disabilities in no way diminish a person's right to fully participate in all aspects
of society, but that people with physical or mental disabilities are frequently precluded
from doing so because of prejudice..."); Krieger, Afterword, supra note 17, at 481
("[T]he drafters of the ADA sought to transform the institution of disability by locating
responsibility for disablement not only in a disabled person's impairment, but also in
'disabling' physical and structural environments.").
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the ADA's toolkit. It is important to understand the rights-centered antidis-
crimination regime as the specific form of the social model in American
law.
Its supporters hailed the Act as "the most comprehensive civil rights
legislation passed by Congress since the 1964 Civil Rights Act."'76 Newspa-
pers called it "a second independence day." 77 The Act continued in the
tradition of broad, bi-partisan political support that had been a staple of
previous disability legislation. 78 It was noted at the time that "the ADA...
is unlike any other major piece of civil rights legislation enacted by Con-
gress because there was no serious opposition."79 The two political parties
supported the legislation for different reasons: Republicans because it
promised to end the era of welfare dependency of persons with disabilities
and Democrats because of its continuity with previous struggles by disad-
vantaged groups for recognition. 80 As one commentator has observed,
"lack of visible opposition to disability rights proposals is a pattern one
sees in all the polities in which such proposals have reached the legislative
agenda." 8 1 In fact, at the signing ceremony of the ADA, President Bush
compared the adoption of the act to the demolition of the Berlin Wall.8 2
The definition of disability in the ADA remained unchanged from the
one used in Section 504. The decision to retain the impairment-based defi-
nition of the Rehabilitation Act, which would play a key role in the judici-
76. See Feldblum, supra note 18, at 139.
77. Diller, supra note 25, at 19 (citing Terry Wilson, For the Disabled, It's 'Indepen-
dence Day,' CHI. TRIB., July 27, 1990, at 1).
78. See Krieger, Foreword, supra note 71, at 1 (noting that the vote in the House of
Representatives was 377-28 and in the Senate was 91-6).
79. RuTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT 23 (2005).
80. See id. at 34, 54.
81. Burke, supra note 15, at 167. Indeed, as the New York Times wrote one year
before the ADA was adopted, "No politician can vote against this bill and survive." Blank
Check for the Disabled, NY Times, Sep. 6, 1989, at A24 (cited in COLKER, supra note 79, at
1).
82. See Krieger, Foreword, supra note 71, at 1. The same is reflected in the ADA's
signing statement: "The Americans with Disabilities Act presents us all with an historic
opportunity. It signals the end to the unjustified segregation and exclusions of persons
with disabilities from the mainstream of American life. As the Declaration of Indepen-
dence has been a beacon for people all over the world seeking freedom, it is my hope
that the Americans with Disabilities Act will likewise come to be a model for the choices
and opportunities of future generations around the world." (President George H. W.
Bush, Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, July 26, 1990).
Though domestic policies often have foreign policy implications, the foreign policy
implications of U.S. disability policy are nevertheless noteworthy. See NATIONAL COUN-
CIL ON DISABILITY, FOREIGN POLICY AND DISABILITY 1 (2001) ("The unparalleled legal pro-
tection given Americans through the Rehabilitation Act, ADA, and other disability rights
laws won the admiration of people with disabilities, human rights activists, and people
of goodwill around the world. These laws underscored the authority of the United States
to speak not only as a rich and powerful nation but also as a good and moral one. By
demonstrating its strong commitment to the equality of all people, including those with
disabilities, the United States strengthened its global position." (quoted in Arlene S.
Kanter, The Globalization of Disability Rights Law, 30 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 241,
248 (2003))).
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ary's application ratione personae of the Act, was not disputed during the
drafting process.83 Although some of the previous drafts proposed a more
detailed definition, it was believed that retaining the existing definition was
advisable given courts' familiarity with it. 8 4 A calculus about risk alloca-
tion and institutional behavior trumped whatever considerations there
might have been, from a social model standpoint, to re-center the definition
of disability on societal discrimination rather than on medical impairment.
In a sense, that calculus was understandable. Under Section 504, disabil-
ity had been interpreted to cover 'traditional' disabilities, such as blindness
or deafness, as well as medical conditions, such as diabetes or epilepsy. It
also covered people with a record of disabilities and those whose medical
conditions, such as asymptomatic HIV, have disabling effects that carry
societal stigma.85 It was only later, when courts started departing from the
broad interpretation of disability, that the consequences of retaining this
definition of disability became clear. Clarilying Congress' aims retrospec-
tively, the 2008 ADAAA states that "while [it] expected that the definition
of disability under the ADA would be interpreted consistently with how
courts had applied the definition of a handicapped individual under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that expectation [had] not been fulfilled."8 6
However, it is telling that even in 2008, Congress refused to modify the
definition of disability and considered it sufficient to direct courts to "con-
strue (the definition of disability) in favor of broad coverage of individu-
als .... to the maximum extent permitted by this chapter."
8 7
To be sure, there was more in the ADA than the interpretation of the
definition of disability that surprised its initial supporters. As far as
employment levels were concerned, unemployment levels for persons with
disabilities stayed high. The causal connection between the existence of
disability and poverty levels remained strong. Both the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) and the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)
grew larger throughout the 1990s.8 8 Why exactly the ADA's effects have
fallen far short of expectations is a matter of dispute. Some observers
place the blame on the courts; others have pointed to the mistaken reliance
on a model of accommodation mandates for private employers.8 9 Still
others have pointed to limitations inherent in the antidiscrimination
model, which does not deliver the broad social welfare reforms indispensa-
ble for the social integration of persons with disabilities.90 Some scholars
83. See Feldblum, supra note 18, at 129. The issue was so low key that, as one
commentator involved in the negotiations writes, "the Section 504 definition of disabil-
ity was hardly a topic of conversation in the negotiations on the ADA." Id.
84. See id. at 126-134.
85. For an account of just how bold the approach was, see Krieger, Foreword, supra
note 71, at 3.
86. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 112 Stat. 3553 § 2, (a)(3)
(2008).
87. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 112 Stat. 3553 § 4 (2008).
88. See Burke, supra notel5, at 163.
89. See generally RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOY-
MENT DIScRIMINATION LAWS (1992).
90. See e.g., Stein & Stein, supra note 25.
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have pointed to unresolved contradictions in the eclectic strategies and
demands originating from within the social disability movement.9 1 While
it is beyond the purpose of the paper to adjudicate definitively these differ-
ent accounts, I submit that the comparison with the European Union
brings to the surface some tensions inherent in both the social model as
well as in the adjudication of the social model that remain obscured when
the focus is solely on the American experience. What makes the compara-
tive analysis even possible is that, for all its shortcomings, the ADA's rights-
based model has been tremendously influential abroad. Indeed, it has
been so successful that observers have quipped that the Act has been more
influential abroad, and especially in Europe, than at home.9 2
C. Trans-Systemic Influences: The Migration of the Antidiscrimination
Model from the United States to Europe
The ADA's influence at the level of the European Community in the
early 1990s occurred mostly via the U.S.-inspired advocacy of the Euro-
pean Disability Forum (EDF). In 1994, the EDF published a white paper
that introduced the discrimination paradigm, which, together with a study
released the year before in which the EDF brought the concept of dignity to
bear on the plight of persons with disabilities, opened the way for a shift in
Community policy. 93 In 1996, the European Commission issued "A Euro-
pean Community Disability Strategy,"9 4 which transformed the Commu-
nity's disability policies. Integration replaced accommodation as the
regulative ideal of the Community disability policy.9 5 The document took
a rather uncharitable view of the charity model that had characterized
Community policy over the previous two decades. After "rethinking [the]
many years of public policy aimed at accommodating people to their disa-
bilities," which it now deemed "insufficient," the Commission embraced
the fundamental insight of the social model that "[c]hanges in the way we
organise our societies can substantially reduce or even overcome obstacles
found by people with disability." '9 6 The absence - or "virtual invisibility" -
of persons with disabilities from the mainstream perpetuated stereotypes
and the continuation of cycles of exclusion.
If integration, or mainstreaming, 97 represented the new goal of Com-
91. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 24.
92. See id. at 11 ("The ADA, for all its limitations, has made our society more accessi-
ble, so much so that the United States is the envy of disability rights activists around the
world.").
93. See generally Commission Green Paper on European Social Policy, COM (93) 551
(Nov. 17, 1993).
94. 1996 EC Disability Strategy, supra note 54.
95. The Council endorsed the social model approach a year later. Council Resolu-
tion on Equality of Opportunity for People with Disabilities (EU) of 20 December 1996,
1997 OJ. (C 12) 1, 2.
96. 1996 EC Disability Strategy, supra note 54, at 2.
97. Id. at 8 (defining mainstreaming as "the formulation of policy to facilitate the
full participation and involvement of people with disabilities in economic, social and
other processes, while respecting personal choice... the relevant issues should no longer
be considered separately from the mainstream policy-making apparatus.").
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munity disability policy, there were some changes in the means by which
the Community sought to accomplish it. The persistent lack of a legal
basis for antidiscrimination measures, through the 1990s, compelled the
Community to continue relying exclusively on the soft law measures that
had characterized its past disability policies.9 8 At the same time, the
emphasis on antidiscrimination made rights central to the new disability
strategy. 99 The reasons for choosing a rights-based strategy are not imme-
diately apparent. Indeed, if the problems of discrimination are structural,
deep, and broad, as advocates of the social model argue, then an emphasis
on rights is somewhat mystifying. In the American context, the rights for-
mulation of the social model is understandable given that rights have his-
torically provided the template in which struggles for recognition are
carried out. But, why a rights approach in Europe?
To start, one should note that the antidiscrimination model was also
normatively consistent with the social model of disability, which advocated
against a passive stance of persons with disabilities and in favor of ena-
bling them to make demands on social institutions. Secondly, disability is
not the first instance where the Community used rights as a template
against discrimination. 10 0 For instance, in the gender context, Article 119
in the original Treaty of Rome stipulated the principle of equal pay for men
and women at work. 1 1 Over time, the sphere of application of the princi-
ple expanded to cover access to employment, vocational training and work-
ing conditions, 10 2 as well as occupational social security schemes. 10 3
Interestingly, this expansion of gender equality was achieved under pres-
sure from the judiciary,10 4 which was itself called upon to act as part of the
larger mobilization of the social movement.10 5 The mainstreaming
approach, which has been successfully advocated in the case of disability
98. See Deborah Mabbett, The Development of Rights-based Social Policy in the Euro-
pean Union: The Example of Disability Rights, 43 J. COMMON MKT. STUDIES 97, 102
(2005).
99. See Council Resolution on Equality of Opportunity for People with Disabilities
(EU) of 20 December 1996, 1997 OJ. (C 12) 1, 2.
100. "Template" here should be understood broadly. As commentators have rightly
noted, there are significant differences between discrimination based on race and disa-
bility on the one hand, and gender on the other. See Lisa Waddington & Mark Bell,
More Equal than Others: Distinguishing European Union Equality Directives, 38 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 587, 588 (2001) [hereinafter Waddington & Bell, More Equal than Others]
("In adopting these new directives the Community has not simply extended the already
existing protection, standards and concepts applicable with regard to sex discrimination
to the newly covered areas."). However, the commonalities among these struggles for
recognition remained strong despite relevant differences among gender, race and disabil-
ity. See KELEMEN, supra note 26, at 213 ("The disability rights movement rode the rights
wave that was sweeping over EU politics at the end of the 1990s, gaining strength by
linking its fortunes to those of other human rights and antidiscrimination causes.")
101. Treaty of Rome, supra note 35, art. 119.
102. See Council Directive 76/207/EEC, 1976 OJ. (L 039) 40-42.
103. See Council Directive 86/378/EEC, 1986 OJ. (L 225) 40-43.
104. See GrAinne de Bfrca, Stumbling into Experimentalism: The EU Anti-Discrimina-
tion Regime, in EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: TOWARDS A NEW
ARCHITECTURE 215, 219 (Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 2010).
105. See id. at 219.
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rights,'0 6 was also the strategy that the Treaty of Amsterdam would later
endorse for gender equality. Yet despite its lack of novelty as a tool, there
was no tradition at the level of the European Community for using courts
for social change through rights adjudication.
For all the influence of the American approach to disability rights, it is
important to note that the American model was not transplanted tale quale.
For instance, unlike its counterpart disability rights movement in the
United States, the EDF has no history of engaging in litigation as a means
for achieving social change.10 7 Moreover, the social model itself went
through a number of adaptations required by the European legal frame-
work. Borrowing the vocabulary of social systems theory, one can say that
the social model was translated by the Community's own jurisprudential
vocabulary-or "code"-to require that broader social measures supple-
ment an American-type antidiscrimination model. First, the American
model received a specifically European, principle-centered expression. 10 8
The European rights strategy takes as a starting point the principle of
equality, which entails the concept of equal opportunities that itself sub-
sumes the principle of non-discrimination. 10 9 Second, the antidiscrimina-
tion model became part of a broader understanding of the social model
that implied, but was not reduced to, rights. Unlike in the United States,
Community policies do not evidence the need for choosing between rights
and broader social measures. The roots of the American perception of a
stark, binary choice can be traced to a general distrust of the state, which
created ambiguities at the heart of the civil rights or women's rights move-
ments. But specifically in the disability context, the rejection of broad
social measures under the antidiscrimination (civil rights) model also has
to do with how that model established itself in contrast to the earlier social
welfare model with its emphasis on medical impairments and paternalistic
social implications. The distrust of the state and the culture of individual-
ism would have perhaps made the battle particularly stark in the United
States, even if it had been fought at the same time both there and in
Europe. But, in fact, by the time the EDF brought it to Europe, that battle
had already been fought in the United States and it had shaped the collec-
106. See id. at 220; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, art. 10, Sep. 5, 2008, 2008 OJ. (C 115) 68 [hereinafter TFEU] ("In
defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to combat
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or
sexual orientation.").
107. See WADDINGTON, FROM ROME TO NICE, supra note 49, at 19 (describing the activi-
ties of the EDF as including campaigning at the European level and active involvement in
policy development and implementation in the EU).
108. See generally PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Armin von
Bogdandy & Jurgen Bast eds., 2006).
109. For this conceptual scheme, see 1996 EC Disability Strategy, supra note 54. See
also Case C 555/07 Seda Kucukdeveci. v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, 2010 E.C.R. 1-0000.
For an analysis of the application and scope of the principle of non-discrimination in EU
law after Kficakdeveci, see Anja Wiesbrock, Case Note, Case C 555/07 Kicukdeveci. v.
Swedex, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 19January 2010, 11 GERMAN L.J. 539
(2010).
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tive memory of the disability advocates. Some of those memories will be
lost as the antidiscrimination model becomes acculturated on European
soil. The European social tradition softened what American advocates of
the antidiscrimination model perceived as a stark choice between rights
and broader social policy.
Placing rights within the broader social model had a reinvigorating
effect on Community disability policy, particularly on its soft law pro-
grams. Once the social model moved toward the center, the politics of
equality was re-energized as soft law measures became more ambitious and
less vague. These measures ranged from political dialogue among Member
States, which resulted in the creation of the High Level Group of Member
States' Representatives on Disability, to social dialogue between employees
and unions and civil dialogue among NGOs.ll 0 Later documents spell out
these ambitious measures in greater detail, for instance the use of the open
method of coordination in the areas of employment, social inclusion, and
lifelong learning.' This was possible because the Commission retained
throughout this period its role of coordinator and facilitator of informa-
tion-exchange among the Member States.1 12
D. Disability Rights: The Social Model in Europe (after 1996)
The 1996 policy shift to the social model of disability at the Commu-
nity level occurred as Member States were negotiating the Treaty of Amster-
dam. In addition to the changes in the overall institutional structure, the
Treaty (signed in 1997 and in force two years later) provided for the first
time the legal basis necessary to combat with traditional, "hard" legal mea-
sures discrimination on a number of grounds, including disability.
Adopted after long-standing opposition mounted by the conservative UK
government, 113 Article 13 (now Art 19-1 TFEU) expanded the traditional
ban on discrimination based on nationality in Article 12 (now Art 18
TFEU) to enable the Council, on a proposal from the Commission and
after consulting the European Parliament, to "take appropriate action to
combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation."' 14 The unanimity requirement
in the Council and its lack of direct effect indicate the sensitive political
110. See 1996 EC Disability Strategy, supra note 54, at 4, 10-11.
111. See 2003 European Action Plan, supra note 12, at 4-6.
112. See 2003 European Action Plan, supra note 12, at 12. ("Most actions in the field of
disability are principally a matter of Member State responsibility and most effectively
dealt with at national level.").
113. United Kingdom White Paper of 12 March 1996 on the IGC: an association of
nations, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/igc1996/pos-en-en.htm ("On Euro-
pean citizenship, human rights and non-discrimination, the UK Government does not
believe the EU is an appropriate forum for the protection of fundamental human rights,
and opposes introducing a general non-discrimination clause covering gender, sexual
orientation, race, religion, age and disability. In general, the UK is concerned that the
creation of new rights might lead to the need to establish new duties, something which it
does not favour on the grounds that the EU is not a state as such.").
114. Treaty of Amsterdam, Oct. 2, 1997, art. 13, 1997 Oj. (C 340) 1.
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nature of this provision. 115
Within a year after the Treaty of Amsterdam came into effect, the Com-
munity had already adopted two directives under Article 13. The first was
the Race Equality Directive, which prohibited discrimination on the ground
of race and ethnic origin in fields such as employment, vocational training,
education, social protection, and access to goods and services. 116 The sec-
ond directive was the Employment Equality Directive, known as the Frame-
work Directive. 1 17  This Directive prohibited direct and indirect
discrimination, including harassment, on the basis of religion or belief, dis-
ability, age, or sexual orientation in the areas of access to employment, self-
employment, occupation, vocational guidance, and training." 8 The
Framework Directive, which applies to both private and public employers,
transplants into Community law the American model of reasonable accom-
modation for persons with disabilities. 1 9 Importantly, like Article 13
itself, the directive does not define disability. As the next section shows in
detail, this policy choice set the stage for the European Court of Justice to
fill in the Community meaning of disability.
The Framework Directive was the Community's first rights-conferring
instrument for persons with disabilities. 120 The rhetoric surrounding its
adoption matches the rhetoric around the ADA. The Commission referred
to it in glowing terms as a path-breaking piece of legislation. 12 1 It forecast
the Directive's "very great" impact given that the new regulatory framework
would require "major changes" in the legal systems of Member States, with
"huge implications" for employers.122 A first glance at its provisions would
115. The same remains true under the Lisbon regime. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Communities art.
19(1), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 OJ. (C 306) 24 ("Without prejudice to the other provisions
of the Treaties and within the limits of the powers conferred by them upon the Union,
the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to
combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability,
age or sexual orientation.").
116. Council Directive 2000/43/EC, art. 3, 2000 OJ. (L 180) 24.
117. Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 OJ. (L 303) 16.
118. See id. at 18-19, arts. 1-3.
119. See id. at 19, art. 5. For an argument about the influence of American law, see
WADDINGTON, FROM ROME TO NIcE, supra note 49, at 24 ("It is submitted that (the ADA)
directly influenced the drafting of Art. 5 of the Framework Employment Directive. In
particular, it is submitted that the term 'reasonable accommodation' . . . was determi-
nant of the terminology used in Article 5. A conscious choice was made to use the term
'reasonable accommodation' in the Directive because of the level of familiarity with this
particular element of the ADA amongst relevant Commission staff, some Member States,
and disability NGOs.").
120. See generally Richard Whittle, The Framework Directive for Equal Treatment in
Employment and Occupation: An Analysis from a Disability Rights Perspective, 27 EUR. L.
REV. 303, 305 (2002).
121. See Commission Staff Working Paper: Disability Mainstreaming in the European
Employment Strategy, at 3, COM (2005) EMCO/11/290605 Uul. 1, 2005). For an analy-
sis of the Commission's broader strategy of regulation under conditions of political frag-
mentation through justiciable rights, in the disability area and beyond, see KELEMEN,
supra note 26, 208-224.
122. 2003 European Action Plan, supra note 12, at 15.
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make such statements surprisingly self-congratulatory. Compared to the
regime that applies to discrimination on the basis of race or gender, the
provisions in the Framework Directive are rather general and open-ended.
For instance, unlike the Race Directive-but like the American ADA-the
Framework Directive does not stipulate the creation of a specialized body
for the promotion of equal treatment on the grounds of race and ethnic
origin. Reflected here is a more general view that, given wide differences in
the nature of the employment market within the different Member States,
national governments need the leeway necessary to achieve their desired
aims. At the same time, allowing for leeway legitimizes the argument that
there is a hierarchy of grounds and legal regimes within the European
equality jurisprudence, with race at the top followed by gender and then
disability and age, and finally sexual orientation. 1 23 However, the enthusi-
asm regarding the disability part of the Directive is easier to understand
once one recalls that, at the time of its adoption, only the UK, Ireland, and
Sweden had comprehensive civil laws prohibiting discrimination on
grounds of disability. 124 While even those legal systems had to at least face
the possibility of having to amend their legislation in order to implement
the Directive,' 25 the Directive would have far-reaching implications in the
legal systems that did not prohibit discrimination on the basis of
disability. 1
26
Like the Treaty itself, the Directive does not define disability.1 2 7 There
are numerous possible reasons for not including a definition in the text of
the Directive: an attempt to side-step the unfortunate judicial evolution of
the ADA in the United States (or similar experiences in the UK); 12 the
difficulty in crafting a definition (it is sometimes said that "there are ... as
many definitions [of disability] as there are disabilities"' 29 );1 30 the fact
123. See Waddington & Bell, supra note 100, at 610-11 (noting this hierarchy and
arguing that it is a result of political pragmatism).
124. See Mark Bell & Lisa Waddington, Reflecting On Inequalities in European Equality
Law, 28 EUR. L. REv. 349, 367 (2003). [hereinafter Bell & Waddington, Reflecting On
Inequalities in European Equality Law]. For instance, the UK Disability Discrimination
Act of 1995 defines a disabled person as a person with "a physical or mental impairment
which has a substantial and long term adverse effect on his ability to carry out normal
day-to-day activities." DDA, Section 1 (1). Employers have routinely challenged whether
the plaintiffs are disabled under the Act, thus giving courts ample opportunities to
develop an extensive jurisprudence with respect to all four parts of the definition
("impairment," "adverse effect," "substantial condition," and "long-term condition"). See
Goodwin v. Patent Office, [1999] I.C.R. 302 [308] - [310] (Eng.).
125. See Bell & Waddington, supra note 124, at 367 n.13 (noting that the British
Disability Discrimination Act does not address indirect discrimination and that the pro-
visions on reasonable accommodation of the Irish Employment Discrimination Act are
too limited by the standards of the Framework Employment Directive).
126. See generally Lisa Waddington, Implementing the Disability Provisions of the
Framework Employment Directive: Room for Exercising National Discretion, in DISABILITY
RIGHTS IN EUROPE: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 107-134 (Anna Lawson & Caroline Good-
ing eds., 2005).
127. See Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 OJ. (L 303) 16.
128. Katie Wells, The Impact of the Framework Employment Directive on UK Disability
Discrimination Law, 32 INDus. L.J. 253, 263 (2003).
129. See Burke, supra note 15, at 160.
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that Community legislation generally does not define suspect grounds,
thus leaving that task to the ECJ; 1 3 1 the political unpalatability of seeking
to overcome differences in the definition of disability among the Member
States; the fear that including a definition would stifle experimentation
with regulatory regimes; and the belief that the definition of disability may
be less important under a social, as compared to a medicalized, model.132
Whatever the real reason for failing to include a definition of disability, the
ECJ interpreted it as a gap that it had a duty to step in and fill.
The Community disability policy after the enactment of the Frame-
work Directive retained the spirit of the 1996 policy shift by seeking to
incorporate rights within a larger framework. The social model, now
expressly mentioned in the relevant Community documents, 133 was inter-
preted to legitimize a comprehensive approach to the disability regula-
tion. 1 3 4 If anything, the approach at that stage was too comprehensive. As
the Commission remarked, "[a]ttitudes do not change automatically or
spontaneously. It is a complex process that requires co-ordinated and inte-
grated policies at all levels of society in order to raise awareness and
remove social and environmental barriers while at the same time enabling
people with disabilities to become involved." 13 5 Seen from this holistic
perspective, the connection between disability and poverty becomes both
visible and possible to conceptualize as the economic offshoot of social
exclusion. 13 6 The Community documents mention a three-prong policy,
namely "(1) EU anti-discrimination legislation and measures, which pro-
vide access to individual rights; (2) eliminating barriers in the environment
that prevent disabled people from exercising their abilities, and (3) main-
130. See Mary Lou Breslin, Introduction, in DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY: INTER-
NATIONAL AND NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES xxviii (Mary Lou Breslin & Silvia Yee eds., 2002).
131. See e.g., Case C-13/94, P v. S and Cornwall County Council, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143
(involving discrimination based on sex); Case C-249/96, Grant v. South-West Trains
Ltd, 1998 E.C.R. 1-621 (involving discrimination based on sexual orientation).
132. 1 offer this as a simple conjecture. One can in fact argue the opposite, namely
that given the diversity of disabilities, an inclusive definition is necessary as a way of
creating a group identity. See Scotch, Social Movement, supra note 15, at 163 ("'disabil-
ity' as a unifying concept that includes people with a wide range of physical and mental
impairments is by no means an obvious category."). Scotch then concludes that, for this
reason, a prerequisite for collective action is the social construction and promulgation of
an inclusive definition of disability.
133. See Commission Communication: Towards a Barrier Free Europe for People with
Disabilities, at 3, COM (2000) 284 final (May 12, 2000) ("The approach to disability
endorsed by the European Union acknowledges that environmental barriers are a
greater impediment to participation in society than functional limitations
[R]esponsibility for these issues remains mainly with the Member States.").
134. See id. (calling for "greater synergy between related issues in the fields of employ-
ment, education and vocational training, transport, the internal market, information
society, new technologies and consumer policy").
135. Comm'n Proposal for a Council Decision on the European Year of People with Disa-
bilities, at 4, COM (2001) 271 final (Aug. 28, 2001).
136. See Ann Elwan, Poverty and Disability: A Survey of the Literature 14 (The World
Bank, Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 9932, 1999) ("The evidence from the
developed countries is that disabled people have lower incomes than non-disabled peo-
ple, even when age is taken into account.").
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streaming disability issues in the broad range of Community policies
which facilitate the active inclusion of people with disabilities."' 3 7 While
concepts such as 'mainstreaming' are terms of art in Community policy, 138
the pillars of the Community policy are nevertheless defined with striking
largesse. Indeed, one reads between the lines the attitude of a body that is
not responsible for their application.
Even with the social model in full swing, the Community continued to
ascribe to itself some of its early role as coordinator of Member States. As
such, its responsibility for the implementation of substantive policy is
ancillary at best: "most actions in the field of disability are principally a
matter of Member State responsibility and most effectively dealt with at a
national level.'139 Staple soft law policies also remained in place, only this
time within a different theoretical framework-the social model-and com-
plementary to hard law. Originating in the Commission is "a commitment
to making full use of voluntary cooperation methods which provide for
adequate participation of all stakeholders: Member States, social partners,
civil society, etc." 140 The same trend continues under the Treaty of Lisbon,
which includes both a general provision on the "mainstreaming" of disabil-
ity,14 1 while at the same time retaining the antidiscrimination para-
digm. 142 The European Disability Strategy for 2010-2020 details a
comprehensive approach that requires reliance on both soft and hard law
measures to achieve goals that range from employment and health to non-
discrimination, social protection, education, and training.
14 3
The previous sections analyzed the disability reform movements in
both the United States and Europe under the influence of the social model,
as it was acculturated differently in these two political systems. These leg-
islative measures were bound to give rise to legal litigation. The next part
turns to this issue; specifically, to how the medicalized approach to disabil-
ity survived the legislative shift towards a discrimination regime, in the
medium provided by judicial decisions.
137. Commission Communication: Situation of Disabled People in the Enlarged European
Union: The European Action Plan 2006-2007, at 3, (COM (2005) 604 final (Nov. 28,
2005).
138. See, e.g., Commission Staff Working Paper: Disability Mainstreaming in the Euro-
pean Employment Strategy, at 3, COM (2005) EMCO/11/290605 (Jul. 1, 2005) ("Main-
streaming means that the needs of disadvantaged people need to be taken into account
in the design of all policies and measures, and that action for the disadvantaged people
is not limited to those policies and measures which are specifically addressing their
needs.").
139. 2003 European Action Plan, supra note 12, at 12.
140. Id. at 4.
141. TFEU, supra note 106, art. 10. ("In defining and implementing its policies and
activities, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation."
142. See id. art. 19.
143. See 2010 EC Disability Strategy, supra note 24.
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II. What's in a Name? Judges and the Definition of Disability
This Part documents the staying power of the medical approach to
disability in the judicial interpretation of the definition of disability. It
shows that this phenomenon is present both in the U.S. and the EU. The
following sections identify the judicial decisions in which judges have exer-
cised the greatest of powers: the power to define concepts such as disability
and change the social, political, and legal discourse of the struggle for
equality of persons with disabilities. Notwithstanding significant differ-
ences in their respective tasks-unlike the American ADA, the Community
Framework Directive does not include a definition of disability-courts
have operated with similar mindsets in interpreting or stipulating the
meaning of disability.
A. The Definition of Disability in EU Law
Sonia Chac6n Navas had been ill at home for eight months and await-
ing surgery when, on a Friday in May 2004, she received notification from
her employer, Eurest Colectividades S.A., that her contract had been termi-
nated, effective the following Monday. The employer, a catering firm, gave
Navas no explanation for her dismissal. However, the notification letter
acknowledged that her dismissal was "unlawful" and it included the
employer's offer to pay Navas financial compensation. 1 44
Spanish law distinguishes between "lawful," "unlawful," and "void"
dismissals.145 Lawful dismissals are dismissals that meet all statutory
requirements of procedure and content. Dismissals are unlawful when they
fail some of the statutory requirements, for instance, the requirement that
the employer justify to the employee why she or he is dismissed. Finally,
void dismissals are dismissals in breach of the employee's public freedoms
or fundamental rights, such as the right not to be discriminated against on
grounds such as gender or disability. Differences in the available remedies
explain the importance of the distinction between unlawful and void dis-
missals. In the case of unlawful dismissals, the employer has the obligation
to pay the former employee financial compensation. If the dismissal is
deemed void, the employee has the right to be reinstated in the position
from which he was wrongfully dismissed, as well as the right to any unpaid
remuneration.
In her action before the national court, Navas sought a declaratory
judgment that her dismissal was void on the ground that Eurest could only
have fired her because of her illness. According to the plaintiff, discrimina-
tion on grounds of illness is a form of disability discrimination. Navas
therefore demanded that she be reinstated in her position. 146
The labor court in Madrid agreed, factually, that illness was the reason
she was fired. 14 7 However, it did not follow that under Spanish law, her
144. Chac6n Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, 18.
145. See id. 21.
146. Id. 9 19.
147. Id. 20.
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dismissal was void. First, the applicable statute did not include illness
alongside age, disability, gender, or race as an enumerated ground that
renders a dismissal void. Second, it was settled precedent under Spanish
law that "illness" was distinct from "disability," and therefore could not be
read into the prohibited grounds. Put differently, Spanish law allowed
Eurest to lawfully act upon its cost-benefit analysis that paying Navas
financial compensation for unlawful dismissal was more cost effective than
filling her position with temporary workers until her health allowed her to
return to work.
Had Spanish law been Navas' only source of rights, the Madrid tribu-
nal would have had to conclude its analysis at this step and hold that finan-
cial compensation was the only remedy for her unlawful dismissal.
However, Navas was also a citizen of the European Union and her legal
heritage includes, in cases such as this, rights granted under Community
law. 148 As both a domestic and a Community court, the national tribunal
must adjudicate cases under the laws of both legal orders.1 49 If illness is
an enumerated ground for unlawful employment dismissals under Com-
munity law, or if disability discrimination under Community law protects
employees dismissed on the basis of their illness, then Navas' dismissal
would be reclassified as void. Recognizing her right to be reinstated in her
position would thus invalidate the legal effects of her employer's cost-bene-
fit analysis about how to fill her position while she was ill at home. The
national court sent a preliminary reference to the European Court of Jus-
tice asking for clarification of whether illness is a prohibited ground for
discrimination under the Directive, either separately or implicitly, under
disability. 150
On the first question, the ECJ adopted a textualist stance and found
that illness - or "sickness," as the Court called it - is not explicitly men-
tioned as a distinct, prohibited ground either in the text of the Directive or
in Article 13 EC, which constituted the general antidiscrimination provi-
sion and the Directive's legal basis. 15 1 The more difficult question is
whether primary or secondary Community legislation prohibits implicit
discrimination based on illness as part of disability discrimination. In the
Court's opinion, the answer to that question depends on the definition of
disability in Community law, specifically in the context of employment
and occupation. However, neither the Directive nor the EC Treaty defines
the concept of disability. 152 Nevertheless, the European Court of Justice
saw in the lack of a definition a gap to be filled. In a manner familiar to the
148. See Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen
1963 E.C.R. 1, 1 3.
149. See Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA,
1978 E.C.R. 629; Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Ali-
mentaci6n SA, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4135.
150. See Chac6n Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, '11 1-2.
151. See id. 46-47, 54-55.
152. See Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 OJ. (L 303) 16; Chac6n Navas, 2006
E.C.R. 1-6467, ( 39. As the previous section speculated, this silence was likely not a
legislative oversight. See supra text accompanying notes 128-132.
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student of its jurisprudence, 15 3 the Court considered it incumbent upon
itself to articulate "an autonomous and uniform interpretation" of the con-
cept of disability. 15 4 It proceeded to define disability as "a limitation
which results in particular from physical, mental or psychological impair-
ments and which hinders the participation of the person concerned in pro-
fessional life."'
1 5 5
This definition is surprising in a number of ways. First, it is strikingly
reminiscent of the medical model, which the Community had explicitly
rejected in 1996.156 Even a cursory foray into the political origins of the
Framework Directive would have unveiled the social model, which concep-
tualizes disability as the effect of societal discrimination, not the individ-
ual's medical condition. One would have reasonably expected-indeed,
commentators did expect15 7 -that the definition of disability would reflect
legislative intent. Instead, the Court assumes that medical impairments
themselves, not the work environment, hinder professional life. Both stake-
holders and academics reacted with surprise to the Court's narrow defini-
tion of disability. Scholars pointed out that the Court's definition is the
same as the individual/medical model of disability, 15 8 and some of them
have gone as far as to argue that this particular definition puts Community
legislation at odds with the Community's commitments as a signatory of
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.159 The disa-
153. See, e.g., Case 327/82, Ekro v. Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees, 1984 E.C.R. 107,
11; Case C-323/03 Comm'n v. Spain, 2006 E.C.R. 1-0000, 32.
154. Chac6n Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, 40, 42 (reasoning that this "follows from
the need for uniform application of Community law and the principle of equality").
155. Id. 43. The Court here followed Advocate General Geelhoed, who defined per-
sons with disability, within the meaning of the directive, as persons with "serious func-
tional limitations (disabilities) due to physical, psychological or mental afflictions."
Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, Case C-13/05, Chac6n Navas v. Eurest Colec-
tividades SA, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, 1 76. The act of discrimination is a reaction to the
social effects of the medical condition, and it is severable from it: "the health problem as
cause of the functional limitation should in principle be distinguished from that limita-
tion." Id. 1 77.
156. See 1996 EC Disability Strategy, supra note 54. The court relied on the definition
of disability set out by the World Health Organization's International Classification of
Functioning, Disability, and Health. According to the court, this definition provides that
"'disability' is a generic term that includes defects, limitations of activity, and restriction
of participation in social life. Sickness is capable of causing defects which disable indi-
viduals." Chacon Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, 9 22.
157. See Wells, supra note 128, at 261 ("There is nothing in the Directive or other
Community materials that supports a definition of disability which limits the scope of
the Directive to considerations of medical impairment rather than disability in the wider
social sense.").
158. Both defining elements of the individual model are present in the Court's defini-
tion: first, the location of the problem of disability within the individual, and second, an
understanding of disability stemming from "the functional limitations and psychological
losses which are assumed to arise from disability." OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note
11, at 32.
159. See Lisa Waddington, Case C-13/05, Chac6n Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA,
judgment of the Grand Chamber of 11 July 2006, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 487 (2007).
But see Waddington, supra note 9, at 18 (noting that the Commission does not "share the
opinion that the Court was out of line with the Convention"). Interestingly, one of the
most recent official documents from the Commission glosses over the Court's definition
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bility rights movement, which played a critical role in pushing the disabil-
ity agenda to the forefront of Community politics, also reacted forcefully to
the definition. 160 Shortly after the Navas judgment was announced, the
European Disability Forum demanded the adoption of a comprehensive
disability directive that would "provide guidance, based on the social
model of disability, on when the person shall be regarded as disabled for
the purposes of the directive." 16
1
Second, the definition is surprising because neither it nor the opinion
of the Court distinguishes among different kinds of medical impairments.
Although the Court explicitly rejects the argument that the Directive pro-
tects an employee as soon as he develops "any type of sickness,"'16 2 there
are important differences between i) medical conditions that are "transi-
tory and minor,"163 ii) conditions such as cancer, MS, or depression,
whose long-term effect is known from the moment when they are diag-
nosed; and iii) medical conditions that can develop into long-term ill-
ness. 164 Moreover, some illnesses (heart -disease, diabetes, asthma,
depression) have long-term effects so debilitating that, while the impair-
ment itself might not be similar in nature to that of deafness or muscular
dystrophy, it leads to comparable social disadvantages. 165 In any event,
by stating that "[tihere is no EU-wide definition of disability." See Commission Staff
Working Document accompanying the Commission Communication: European Disability
Strategy 2010-2020, at 4, SEC (2010) 1323 final (Nov. 15, 2010). The document then
mentions the definition of disability included in the UN Convention. See id.
160. See, e.g., European Disability Forum, Proposal by the European Disability Forum
for a Comprehensive Directive to Combat Discrimination Against Persons with Disabili-
ties 6-7 (2008) ("The Court's judgment showed a lack of understanding of the social
model and relied on an out-dated medical approach in developing a definition of disabil-
ity for the purposes of the Directive.") http://www.edf-feph.org/PageGenerale.asp?Doc
ID=13854&thebloc=13856.
161. See European Disability Forum, EDF Absolute Demands on the Future Non-Dis-
crimination Directive, http://www.edf-feph.org/Page-Generale.asp?DoclD=18330 ("The
Directive must provide guidance, based on the social model of disability, on when the
person shall be regarded as disabled for the purposes of the directive.").
162. See Chac6n Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, 9 46.
163. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 3, 122 Stat. 3553,
3553 (2008) (One of the grounds of "disability" is "being regarded as having such an
impairment (as described in paragraph (3))." Id. (1)(C). "Paragraph (1)(C) shall not
apply to impairments that are transitory and minor. A transitory impairment is an
impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less." Id. (3)(B)); see
also Commission Communication: Towards a Barrier Free Europe for People with Disabili-
ties, at 4, COM (2000) 284 final (May 12, 2000) ("People with disabilities do not consti-
tute an homogeneous group and there is a broad range of disabilities and issues.
Disabilities may be apparent or hidden, severe or mild, singular or multiple, chronic or
intermittent.").
164. For this distinction, including specific examples, see European Disability Forum,
EDF Analysis of the First Decision of the European Court of justice on the Disability
Provisions of the Framework Employment Directive 7 (2006) http://cms.horus.be/files/
99909/MediaArchive/pdf/edf%2ointerpretation%20of% 2Othe%20ecj%20judgement.
pdf.
165. See, e.g., World Health Organization, Diabetes Fact Sheet, http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/factsheets/fs312/en/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2011) (noting that diabetes and
its complications "have a significant economic impact on individuals, families, health
systems and countries").
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surprising in the Court's failure to fine-tune the legal analysis is not its
unawareness of these distinctions, but the implicit-read, unjustified-
refusal to deem the distinctions relevant.' 66 Such distinctions certainly
did not look irrelevant in Navas' case. Although the record did not contain
details regarding the plaintiffs medical condition, the Court nevertheless
had sufficient evidence to conclude that her illness was not minor, and that
it had lasted far too long to be labeled transitory. Chronic illness, tempo-
rary disability, and other such categories blur the lines between illness,
impairment, and disability in the Court's analysis and reveal its thin con-
ceptual grounds.
Finally, the definition is surprising because the Court's reasoning
seems markedly uninformed by the historical, political, and normative
debate regarding the meaning of disability in Europe and abroad. Not once
in the entire judgment does the Court so much as hint at the transforma-
tion of disability law from the medical to the social model. As I have
argued elsewhere, this type of legal analysis is the inescapable consequence
of a collegial form of judgment.1 6 7 Allowing judges to enter separate and
concurring opinions would bring about a discursive turn in the Court's
jurisprudence, rendering its judicial reasoning more transparent and per-
haps even deepening it. For instance, one effect might have been to limit
the holding. Even assuming the Court's intention to reject the view of the
referring court that "a worker should ... be protected [as disabled] as soon
as the sickness is established,"' 168 which indeed many social advocates
would also oppose, it does not follow that the Court should have adopted a
far-reaching, impairment-centered definition of disability. However,
despite the fact that the final judgment does not contain any traces of disa-
greement about different interpretations of disability, it would be unwar-
ranted to assume that the array of approaches and concerns laid out by
American courts do not apply in the European context. 16 9
166. To his credit, the Advocate General at least signaled-without offering solu-
tions-the relevance of distinguishing among different kinds of medical impairments.
Opinion of Advoc. Gen. Geelhoed, Chac6n Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, 1 63 ("One of the
characteristics often referred to in the literature to distinguish disabilities from diseases
is the permanence of the physical or mental defect. In most cases there is indeed a
sound basis. However, there are progressive diseases entailing serious and long-lasting
losses of function which impede the functioning of patients so badly that they do not
differ significantly in society from 'permanently' disabled people.").
167. See Vlad Perju, Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice, 49 VA. J.
INT'L L. 307, 367 (2009).
168. See Opinion of Advoc. Gen. Geelhoed, Chac6n Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, 27.
169. The judgment of the Navas court comes close to the medicalized approach to
disability of UK courts. Even if the UK DDA implements a medicalized approach, courts
have gone out of their way to limit the ratione personae of the statute beyond what the
medical model would have required. For instance, judges have introduced a third cate-
gory of physiologically-caused impairments alongside mental and physical impairments,
which the DDA mentions explicitly. In cases involving plaintiffs with physical impair-
ments, such as shoulder injuries, neck and spine injuries, and severe back pain, that had
no identifiable physical cause but certifiable effects, courts considered the physiological
nature of the impairment and denied plaintiffs DDA coverage on the ground that the
impairments lacked a "clinically well recognized" diagnostic. See Rugamer v. Sony
Music Entertainment UK Ltd, [2001] IRLR 644; McNicol v. Balfour Beatty Rail Mainte-
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It is often remarked that American courts pay no heed to the jurispru-
dence of their foreign counterparts. But a similar phenomenon is over-
looked when the culprit is a foreign court, including supranational courts
such as the ECJ. Had the ECJ looked at American litigation of the ADA,
either of its own initiative or at the invitation of the Advocate General
("AG"), the Commission, or the parties, it might have learned important
lessons about the risks involved in not only defining disability narrowly,
but also, and perhaps more importantly, in dwelling on the definition of
the protected class in the first place. The next section briefly sketches the
American experience.
B. The Definition of Disability in American Law
Writing a decade after the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")
was enacted, Richard Scotch noted that "the legal system [had] become the
primary arena for challenges to the ADA's broad focus and underlying
assumptions."'170 This development is not entirely surprising in a society
where most struggles for recognition eventually end up in courts. More
striking, however, is the dramatically one-sided effect of courts in the direc-
tion of limiting the ADA's reach and undermining its ambition. A study
from 1998 found employer-defendants winning in 92 percent of cases
under the ADA. 17 1 Many of these cases ended at the summary judgment
stage after courts found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the statutory defi-
nition of disability.17 2  Since earlier studies show plaintiffs winning in
about one-third of all ADA cases that got to the jury or the judge on a
bench trial, t 73 one gets a better sense of how many suits were terminated
at the summary judgment stage. Scholars have referred to this combina-
tion of a narrow definition of disability and the use of summary judgments
as a "powerful one-two punch."' 74 This section describes briefly the first
jab, so to speak, namely the definition of disability.
The ADA defines "disability" as (a) a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual, or (b) a record of such an impairment, or (c) being regarded as
having such an impairment. 1 75 This definition was almost identical to the
nance Ltd [2002] ICR 381 (EAT). "[S]hort of satisfactory medical evidence of a diag-
nosed or diagnosable clinical condition or other mental disorder of a recognizable type,
evidence simply of a restriction of a person's level of function or activity accompanied by
a general suggestion that this is (or may be) a manifestation of some psychological state
will not meet the statutory threshold for establishing mental impairment." Id. j 45. Of
course, to the extent that physical and mental impairments require medical diagnosis,
disability cases involve complex questions of fact whose determination at the trial level
is likely to be upheld on appeal. On this point, see Wells, supra note 128, at 256.
170. Scotch, Models, supra note 3, at 213.
171. Am. Bar Ass'n, supra note 27, at 403.
172. See COLKER, supra note 79, at 96; see also id. at 78 (noting a trend over time for
more employment discrimination cases, not just ADA cases, to be decided by summary
devices rather than by completed trials).
173. Id. at 71.
174. Id. at 115.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
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definition of "handicap" in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973;
Congress was legislating against the backdrop of courts adopting a broad
view of the definition of "handicap" in Section 504 litigation. 176 Stated
retrospectively, on the occasion of the 2008 ADA, "while Congress
expected that the definition of disability under the ADA would be inter-
preted consistently with how courts had applied the definition of a handi-
capped individual under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that expectation
[had] not been fulfilled."'17 7 What happened?
The short answer is that, instead of continuing their earlier practice of
interpreting broadly the protected class of persons with disabilities, judges
reached for the magnifying glass and began scrutinizing the different com-
ponents of the definition of disability. After years of litigation in lower
courts, cases made their way up to the Supreme Court in the later
1990S.1 78 The Court started developing from the top down an intricate
jurisprudence on the meaning of "physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more of the major life activities," as well as on the
"regarded as" prong of the statutory definition. 179 The net result has been
a shift away from litigation over the content of the duty to provide reasona-
ble accommodation,' 8 0 coupled with a narrow interpretation of the pro-
tected class, which resulted in denial of protection to many plaintiffs who
would have been covered under the 1973 Act. As Congress noted retro-
spectively in 2008, this created an "inappropriately high level of limitation
necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA." 18'
A landmark case from 1999, Sutton v. United Airlines,'8 2 exemplifies
the judiciary's approach. That case involved a challenge to United Airlines'
minimum vision requirement for global pilots. The plaintiffs, two seri-
ously myopic twin sisters whose visual acuity was 20/200 or worse, chal-
lenged as discriminatory under the ADA the airline's refusal to hire them
176. See Feldblum, supra note 18, at 93.
177. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 112 Stat. 3553 § 2, (a)(3)
(2008).
178. See Aviam Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability,
47 UCLA L. Rev. 1279 (2000) (analyzing the six ADA decisions during the 1998 Term,
which involved statutory interpretation). Earlier, the Supreme Court had refused to rec-
ognize mental disability as a suspect class. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). For a discussion of Cleburne as well as other Supreme
Court equal protection cases, from the perspective of the minority group model, see
Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or Biased Reasoning?, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. LAB. L. 166, 182-191 (2000).
179. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998) (holding that asymptomatic
HIV infection constitutes a disability under the ADA). For a review of the early cases on
the "regarded as" prong, see generally Risa M. Mish, "Regarded as Disabled"Claims Under
the ADA: Safety Net or Catch-All ?, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 159 (1998).
180. See Diller, supra note 25, at 25 ("The problem is not that the courts view all
accommodations as "unreasonable" or "undue burdens" on employers, but that they
rarely even get to the point of reaching such issues.").
181. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 112 Stat. 3553, 3554 § 2
(b)(5) (2008).
182. 527 U.S. 471 (1999). In a companion case, the Court had to decide whether
blood pressure controlled by medication constituted a disability within the meaning of
the ADA. See Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
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on the ground that they failed to meet a minimum requirement of uncor-
rected visual acuity of 20/100 or better.' 8 3 Although eyeglasses or contact
lenses entirely corrected the sisters' vision, the plaintiffs argued that, left
uncorrected, their visual impairments substantially limited a major life
activity, namely work. In the Court's view, the case raised the question of
whether corrective measures, such as assistive or prosthetic devices, should
be taken into consideration in determining whether a plaintiff is disabled
within the meaning of the ADA. Unlike under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, where the courts would have considered the plaintiffs disabled and
then proceeded to determine whether they had been the subject of discrim-
ination, the Sutton court dwelled on the question of whether the plaintiffs
met the statutory requirements of disability. 184 Here, in order for the
Court to advance to the discrimination analysis, the court would need to
determine that corrective measures that mitigate an individual's impair-
ment should not be taken into consideration in determining whether that
individual is disabled under the ADA, as the implementation guidelines of
the EEOC suggested.
The Court disagreed with the EEOC guidelines and held that correc-
tive measures ought to be taken into consideration.'8 5 Put differently, only
those plaintiffs whose use of corrective measures does not mitigate the
effect of their medical impairment, and whose impairment is substantially
limiting as to one or more of the major life activities, are considered dis-
abled. Dismissing in no uncertain terms the relevance of congressional
purpose that the Act should cover the use of corrective measures,' 8 6 the
Court adopted a textualist method of interpretation.' 8 7 Specifically, the
Justices pointed out the use of the present indicative verb form in the defi-
nition of disability as an impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity, and interpreted it as a need that a person be substantially limited
at present by the impairment.' 8 8 Moreover, examining impairments in
their uncorrected state would bring within ADA coverage a number far
beyond the 43 million Americans that Congress mentioned in the ADA's
preamble.' 8 9 The need for an individualized assessment is itself inter-
preted as mandated by the text, specifically the mention of "such individ-
183. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475.
184. See id. at 481-94.
185. See id. at 482.
186. Id. ('Justice Stevens relies on the legislative history of the ADA for the contrary
proposition that individuals should be examined in their uncorrected state. Because we
decide that, by its terms, the ADA cannot be read in this manner, we have no reason to
consider the ADA's legislative history.").
187. The literature on textualism in American law is extensive. See generally John F.
Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REv. 419 (2005); Caleb Nelson,
What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REv. 347 (2005).
188. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
189. See id. at 487 ("Had Congress intended to include all persons with corrected
physical limitations among those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a
much higher number of disabled persons in the findings."). For instance, in the case of
corrected vision alone, that figure would be higher than 100 million. See Feldblum,
supra note 18, at 153-154.
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ual" in the statutory definition of disability.' 90 In addition to clarifying the
first, "substantially limits," definition of disability, the Sutton Court inter-
preted other parts of the definition of disability. 19 1 For instance, the court
rejected the plaintiffs' claim that poor vision affected their capacity to
"work" as a major life activity within the meaning of the statute. 192 The
plaintiffs' ability to work as global airline pilots had been affected; however,
their skills qualified them for other positions, such as regional pilot or pilot
instructor. This line of argument makes apparent the consequences in the
definitional shift that represents a novelty in ADA adjudication compared
to the 1973 Rehabilitation Act. Assuming that the discrimination-not the
conceptual/definitional analysis -was the center of gravity of the legal anal-
ysis, fears of either diluting the protection afforded to persons with disabili-
ties or of increased litigation would be unwarranted. As the dissenters in
Sutton point out, vision is important to airline pilots, but it is not nearly as
important to most other employers. 19 3 Plaintiffs that would try to benefit
from abusively enlarging the protected class under the ADA would be easily
filtered out at the discrimination stage of the analysis.' 9 4 However, that
later stage of the analysis is seldom reached when litigation focuses on the
conceptual issue of the definition of disability.
The ascendency of Sutton's conceptualist approach led to some bizarre
results in subsequent cases. 19 5 Scholars documented how, between 1995
and 1996, from a total of 110 cases decided on the definition of disability,
only one plaintiff out of six met the statutory definition. 196 Impairments
190. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482. "The use or nonuse of a corrective device does not
determine whether an individual is disabled; that determination depends on whether
the limitations an individual with an impairment actually faces are in fact substantially
limiting." Id. at 488. The requirement of an individualized approach has become a
landmark of the court's jurisprudence in this area. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,
527 U.S. 555, 566 (1999) (mentioning a "statutory obligation to determine the existence
of disabilities on a case-by-case basis."); see also Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky., Inc., 534 U.S. at
198-99 (holding that the determination of the existence of disability should be made in a
"case-by-case manner" through "[ain individualized assessment of the effect of an
impairment .. "). The Court has, however, mentioned that "[slome impairments may
invariably cause a substantial limitation of a major life activity." See Albertson's, Inc.,
527 U.S. at 556.
191. For instance, the court interpreted the "regarded as" prong of the definition of
disability. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489 ("There are two apparent ways in which individu-
als may fall within this statutory definition: (1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that
a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activ-
ities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, non-limiting impairment
substantially limits one or more major life activities.") The court then pointed out that
this prong applies to protect persons with disabilities from "stereotypic assumptions"
based on "myths and fears about disability." Id.
192. See id. at 492.
193. See id. at 510 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194. See id.
195. The scholarly literature has faulted the Sutton court for both logical and norma-
tive flaws in the reasoning. See COLKER, supra note 79, at 105 (interpreting Sutton as
instructing courts to "determine whether the plaintiffs were disabled in their corrected
state, despite the fact that the employer insisted that they take the test in the uncorrected
state.") (emphasis in original).
196. See Feldblum, supra note 18, at 139.
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such as epilepsy, cancer, and diabetes were not recognized as covered. The
1999 Supreme Court cases in a sense ratified this development of the juris-
prudence. Narrow statutory construction of concepts such as "major activ-
ity" and "substantial limitations" meant that individuals with impairments
among the most serious (breast cancer, MS, lymphoma, brain tumors,
hemophilia, epilepsy, and depression 19 7) might not qualify for ADA protec-
tion. Meeting the definition of disability became especially burdensome on
plaintiffs and explains why many failed in the courts.198 As one commen-
tator noted with appropriate sarcasm, "despite the enormity of [the figure
mentioned in the ADA preamble], the court decisions suggest that the peo-
ple who choose to sue under the ADA are seldom among this group."' 19 9
This trend of narrowing the definition of disability, and by conse-
quence, the class of individuals protected from discrimination, continued
in future cases. In Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, the Court
expanded further on the meaning of "substantial limitation" of a major life
activity, as well as on the meaning of "major life activity."'20 0 The case
raised the question of whether the plaintiff-worker's carpal tunnel syn-
drome and other conditions involving her wrists, elbows, and shoulders
substantially limited her in the major life activity of performing manual
tasks at the Toyota facility where she was an employee. 20 1 As to the meth-
odology, Justice O'Connor wrote, for a unanimous court, that it was
"guided first and foremost by the words of the disability definition
itself."20 2 The court found that an impairment "substantially limits" a
major life activity when it limits it "to a large degree" or "considerabl[y]" in
terms of nature, severity and duration. 20 3 Regarding the meaning of
"major life activity" itself, it referred, in the Court's interpretation, to activi-
ties that are of central importance to daily life.20 4 Thus, "to be substan-
tially limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must have an
impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing
activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives."'20 5
Since repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or above the shoul-
der for extended periods of time is not an important part of most people's
daily lives, the plaintiff was not included in the protected class under the
ADA.20 6 That a plaintiff suffering from medical conditions such as carpal
tunnel syndrome, myotendinitis, and thoracic outlet compression would
not be recognized as disabled under the ADA explains why the Court's
narrow definition was meant expressly to "create ... demanding stan-
197. See Diller, supra note 25, at 26.
198. See id. at 28 ("[ADA] cases require plaintiffs to amass a wealth of demographic
and economic data, potentially turning individual ADA cases into battles of labor mar-
ket experts.").
199. Id. at 26.
200. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 534 U.S. at 196-97.
201. See id. at 196.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 197.
205. Id. at 198.
206. See id. at 201.
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dard[s] for qualifying as disabled. 20 7
An alternative approach would have been to interpret the concept of
disability broadly and shift the bulk of the legal analysis to the question of
discrimination. 20 8 Instead, the court channeled more of its interpretative
energy towards the definitional question. It looked specifically at the medi-
cal impairment-and even then, it did not ask the question of the impair-
ment's social effects, but rather turned to issues such as: "the nature and
severity of the impairment; the duration or expected duration of the
impairment; the permanent or long-term impact, or the expected perma-
nent or long-term impact of or resulting from the impairment. '20 9 In the
2008 ADAAA, Congress rejected the judicial narrowing of "the broad
scope of protection intended to be afforded to the ADA, thus eliminating
protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect. '210
However, without a deeper understanding of the root causes of the courts'
approach, Congress' action is a mere reprimand that will unlikely lead to
the desired results. Uprooting the backlash depends on answers to ques-
tions such as: why is the impairment-centered approach to disability so
appealing; why can't courts break away; and, why do they remain tied to
the medicalized understanding of disability, despite the legislative shift
away from it?
III. Explaining the Resilience of the Medicalized Model in Judicial
Definitions of Disability
Part III identifies explanations offered for the medicalized, narrow
interpretations of disability in the American context and asks if they help
in understanding the comparable approach of European courts. The expla-
nations are divided into two categories. Among explanations endogenous
to legal reasoning, the first section discusses doctrinal, interpretative, and
jurisprudential explanations. In the second group are explanations exoge-
nous to law, understood quasi-autonomously. The explanations in this
second group find the causes of the conceptual turn outside of law and
legal doctrine, specifically in the composition of the judiciary, in its ideo-
logical commitments, or in the institutional tensions between courts and
legislators. Because I do not believe in a strict approach to law's autonomy,
the distinction between endogenous and exogenous explanations aims
207. Id. at 197.
208. The focus on the definitional stage is part of a larger approach to rights in Amer-
ican law. The resistance of American constitutional law to the proportionality method is
one example. See generally Mattias Kumm, Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the
Structure and Domain of Constitutional Justice, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 574 (2004).
209. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 0)(2) (listing factors that should be considered
in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity).
210. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 112 Stat. 3553, 3553 § 2
(a)(4) (2008). In the 2008 ADA Amendments Act, Congress explicitly overruled Sutton
and Toyota. With respect to Sutton, it rejected "the requirement... that whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity is to be determined with reference to
the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures." Id. (b)(2).
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solely to bring structure and clarity to the analysis. Any account of the
judiciary's definitional work in this area will draw on both types of expla-
nations. My aim in this section is to show that at least in the European
context, these accounts are insufficient, taken both severally and together.
In the next section I offer an additional explanation for the staying power
of the medicalized approach to disability in judicial definitions of disability
that applies to Europe and might also enhance the understanding of the
comparable phenomenon in the United States.
As a caveat before we proceed, it is important to recall that there are
important differences between the American and the European contexts.
The textual starting point of judicial interpretation is different. American
courts interpreted the ADA's statutory definition of disability, whereas the
Community Directive included no specific definition. Moreover, the Amer-
ican experience with the ADA has been ongoing for almost two decades, in
contrast to the European experience at the supranational level. Differences
in the number of disability cases can be explained by reference to the rela-
tively short period that has passed since the deadline for the implementa-
tion of the Framework Directive. These differences are also related to the
distinct positions that the ECJ and the US Supreme Court occupy in their
respective jurisdictions. Thus, the analysis in this section is by necessity
provisional in character. It is too early now for a comprehensive analysis of
the impact that Chac6n Navas will have in the national laws of the member
states. We do know that it led to the rejection of Ms. Chac6n Navas' own
claim by the referring court. 2 11 While there are decisions of national
courts that have cited to different aspects of the Navas opinion, 21 2 a com-
prehensive impact study would be premature.
A. Endogenous Explanations
This section analyzes doctrinal, interpretative, and jurisprudential
explanations of the resilience of the medicalized approach in judicial defi-
nitions of disability.
1. Doctrinal Explanations: The Illusion of Retrospective Determinism
It is sometimes argued that plaintiffs lose under the ADA because their
claims are weak under the law.2 13 They either fail to prove that they are
"disabled" within the meaning of the ADA, or, when they have standing,
they cannot convince courts that employers owe them a duty to provide
reasonable accommodation for their disability.2 14 By itself, this doctrinal
211. See Chac6n Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, 9 2.
212. See Paterson v. Commn'r of Police of the Metropolis (EAT (UK)), 120071 I.C.R.
1522; Chief Constable of Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary v. Adams (EAT(Sc)),
[2009] I.C.R. 1034 (UKEATS/46/08) (discussing the "normal day-to-day activities" and
"professional life" prongs of the definition). For a decision of the Irish Equality Tribunal
where the ECJ's narrow interpretation was detrimental to the plaintiff alleging discrimi-
nation on the basis of disability, see DEC-E2010-045, Laurence O'Rourke v. JJ Red Hold-
ings Ltd., 5.7.
213. See Diller, supra note 25, at 21.
214. See id. at 25.
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explanation-which sounds more like a description of judicial holdings
than an explanation-is an instance of what the French philosopher Henry
Bergson called "the illusions of retrospective determinism."2 15 Like all
doctrinal explanations, this account is self-evident to the extent that the
losing party will have, retrospectively and from a formal juridical stand-
point, the weaker legal claim. But this explanation ignores the doctrinal
hurdles imposed on plaintiffs by courts interpreting the ADA. For instance,
such an account must explain why medical conditions such as hemophilia,
cancer (active or in remission), or diabetes, which had been covered under
the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, were deemed by courts to fail to meet the stat-
utory definition of disability under the ADA, considering that the defini-
tion had been transposed from the 1973 Act. 2 16 The rates at which
plaintiffs lost under the ADA brings to the forefront the doctrinal hurdles -
especially regarding standing-that courts erected by narrowly interpreting
the statutory definition of disability. A doctrinal edifice built on a statu-
tory provision, such as the statutory definition of disability, must by neces-
sity be supplemented with an account of the method of interpretation that
courts used in erecting that edifice. And since no text interprets itself, the
choice of the method of interpretation takes us beyond legal doctrine. I
will discuss that choice in the next section.
The doctrinal explanation is harder to dismiss in the European context
because neither primary nor secondary Community legislation included a
definition of disability. The ECJ filled that gap and stipulated an "autono-
mous and uniform application (of the Directive) throughout the Commu-
nity."'2 17 In the Court's view, allowing national jurisdictions to interpret
the meaning of disability according to their national laws would result in a
differential application of the Directive across the Union territory, and thus
lead to disparate protection of persons suffering from similar disabilities.
At least prima facie, this is a sound, doctrinal explanation of the need for a
definition of disability at the Community level.
The real question is whether the Court had doctrinal reasons for
choosing the particular impairment-centered definition of disability,
instead of other available definitions. 2 18 For instance, the ECJ explained
that the legislature deliberately used "disability" as opposed to "sickness,"
and hence "the two concepts cannot ...simply be treated as being the
same."2 19 But there are a number of possible definitions that do not con-
215. TIMoTHY GARTON ASH, HISTORY OF THE PRESENT xiv (1999) (quoting Henri
Bergson).
216. See Diller, supra note 25, at 21 n.20.
217. Chac6n Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, 40.
218. See Chac6n Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, 22; World Health Organization, Interna-
tional Classification of Functioning, Disability, and Health (2001) http://www.nda.ie/
cntmgmtnew.nsf/0/6877A99815DA544980257066005369Dl?OpenDocument (defin-
ing disability as "the negative aspects of the interaction between an individual (with a
health condition) and that individual's contextual factors (environmental and personal
factors)").
219. Chac6n Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, 9 44.
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flate disability with "any type of sickness."220 The Court also noted that
the Directive mandates employers to provide reasonable accommodation
for their disabled employees, while at the same time making explicit that
the duty is not owed to employees that cannot perform the essential func-
tions of the position.2 2 1 Yet it hardly follows that an employee who misses
work cannot perform the essential functions of the position. For instance,
the essential functions of a job might not require a fixed schedule. An atyp-
ical work schedule is not tantamount to "missing work," but rather, it can
represent accommodation in the form of a "flexible schedule."
There are situations-including Navas' situation itself, where at least
some scenarios could not be ruled out given the limited information that
courts had about her condition-where the employees might suffer from an
illness "capable of causing defects which disable individuals."2 22 Disabil-
ity often occurs during adulthood and often causes disruption in physical,
mental, sensory, or intellectual functions, which in turn cause people to
miss work. An employee, like Navas, who becomes disabled while
employed, will presumably have to miss a substantial amount of work for
disability-related reasons. During that period in which the disability might
not yet be fully realized, such a person is not (or not-yet) disabled, but ill.
The result of denying persons in this category the remedy of reinstatement,
when their medical impairments are the reasons for their dismissal, would
lead to the bizarre conclusion that a person would be better off becoming
impaired while unemployed, since that eliminates the social and psycholog-
ical burden of being fired from a job where one could expect to return.
There are thus doctrinal reasons why, as the Madrid Tribunal argued in its
reference to the ECJ in Navas, "a worker should be protected as soon as
sickness is established.
'
"
223
I do not mean to take a stand-at least not yet-on whether those are
good doctrinal arguments. The doctrinal solution of the ECJ in Navas rests
on theoretical premises about a continuum between impairment and disa-
bility. Some social actors share these normative assumptions. For
instance, the European Disability Forum took the same position, arguing
that the difference between disability and illness is quantitative, and that
any illness that has long-term effects (such as heart disease, diabetes,
asthma, depression) constitutes a disability. 224 However, there are strong
arguments, some from within the disability movement, to oppose the con-
tinuum approach. Others argue, for reasons I will discuss in Part IV, in
favor of a binary approach to illness and disability. As a consequence, they
generally support the holding in Navas and the American approach that the
ADA "is not a general protection of medically afflicted persons ... [if] the
employer discriminates against them on account of their being (or being
believed by him to be) ill, even permanently ill, but not disabled, there is
220. See infra Part IV.A.
221. Chac6n Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, 9 49.
222. Chac6n Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, ' 22.
223. Opinion of Advoc. Gen. Geelhoed, Chac6n Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, 27.
224. European Disability Forum, EDF Analysis, supra note 164, at 8.
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no violation. '225 But the point here is that doctrine is only the conse-
quence of a larger theoretical standpoint about the relationship between
disability, impairment, illness, and discrimination. The doctrinal explana-
tion is insufficient because the doctrinal solutions themselves are not free
standing.
2. Methods of Interpretation: Textualism
The U.S. Supreme Court used textualism as its method of choice in
interpreting the ADA and especially the statutory definition of disability.
Textualism here refers to a method of interpreting the statutory definition
of disability literally, without attention either to its purpose or to legislative
history. As Justice O'Connor wrote in Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Wil-
liams, for a unanimous Court, the Court's inquiry is "guided first and fore-
most by the words of the disability definition itself."'226 As we saw, the
Court decided cases by focusing on the present indicative verb form in the
definition of disability (as an impairment that substantially limits a major
life activity), 227 the figure of 43 million persons with disabilities included
in the ADA's preamble, and the constitutive elements of disability: impair-
ment that "substantially limits" a "major life activity."'22 8 The Court
declined to look beyond the words to their origin and purpose, or to the
larger political and legal context in which the definition was enacted.
Many commentators have been surprised by the judicial turn to textualism,
especially given that courts had broadly interpreted the almost identical
1973 Rehabilitation Act definition of "handicapped persons," rarely paus-
ing over it, and accordingly, over the contours of the protected class. Con-
gress expressed a similar surprise when it amended the ADA in 2008.229
However, from the Court's perspective, the gap between legislative inten-
tion and statutory text should not be blamed on the interpreter. Although
it remains an open question of legislative craft whether laws can be so
worded to reflect perfectly the legislative intent, Justice O'Connor chastised
the drafters of the ADA precisely for failing to express their intentions accu-
rately.230 In any event, it is apparent that the choice of textualism was
225. Christian v. St. Anthony Med. Ctr., Inc., 117 F.3d 1051,1053 (7th Cir. 1997); see
also Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming judgment for the
employer where plaintiff was disqualified from being a firefighter based on his hemo-
philia because hemophilia is not a disability per se, and the field of firefighting jobs was
so narrow that plaintiff was not substantially limited in the major life activity of
working).
226. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 534 U.S. at 196.
227. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
228. See id. at 487.
229. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 112 Stat. 3553 § 2,
(a)(3) (2008) ("[Wlhile Congress expected that the definition of disability under the
ADA would be interpreted consistently with how courts had applied the definition of a
handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that expectation has not
been fulfilled.").
230. The question of Congressional intent is complex. The ADA's over-reliance on
litigation is notable, by contrast to alternative institutional strategies, such as the crea-
tion of an agency, as a means for addressing deep-rooted discrimination against persons
with disabilities. I am thankful to Richard Stewart for discussion on this point. But see
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made at the expense of methods that would have given weight to legislative
intent. Even so, however, the words of the definition of disability could
have been interpreted narrowly or broadly. Thus, the Court's choice of a
narrow textualist interpretation must also be explained.
2 3
'
Reference to textualism needs to be even more nuanced when applied
to the ECJ's decision in Navas. The Framework Directive did not contain a
definition that the Court could interpret. However, the Court did rely on a
textualist (and generally non-purposivist) method, which it combined with
purposivist and selective historical methods of interpretation.
23 2
The reader will recall that the preliminary reference in Navas was two-
fold: first, the referring court asked the ECJ whether illness is included as
part of disability; second, should the court answer the first question in the
negative, the referring court asked if illness constituted a separately pro-
hibited ground.23 3 Like the U.S. Supreme Court, the ECJ did not inquire
into the legislative process that had produced the Directive. As we saw in
Part I, the Directive had been the culmination of the Community's policy
shift from the mid-1990s toward a social model of disability; we also saw
that legislative history would conflict with the narrow definition that the
Court adopted in the decision. Nevertheless, legislative history was not
entirely absent from the Court's opinion if we expand its framework of
authority to include the Opinion of Advocate General ("AG") Geelhoed,
whose conclusions on this matter the Court could be read as endorsing.
AG Geelhoed treats legislative history in a selective-one might say strategi-
cally selective-fashion. Specifically, his analysis papers over the legislative
history of the Framework Directive but dwells at length on "the restraint
shown by the authors of the Treaty" in then-Article 13 EC, which the Direc-
tive's recitals mention as its legal basis. 23 4 In his interpretation, the history
of the article justifies a narrow, literal interpretation. Per a contrario, an
expansive interpretation would disrupt the fragile equilibrium between the
Community and the Member States that underlined the negotiations for
then-Article 13. The equilibrium is reflected in the text of the provision: it
provides a legal basis only for "appropriate action"; the enumeration of
prohibited grounds is exhaustive;2 35 its subsidiary nature; and the express
mention of the limits on the Community's powers. 23 6 In AG Geelhoed's
view, a broad interpretation of disability, one that would for instance
encompass illness, risks making then-Article 13 an all-purpose tool in the
hands of the Community, thus undermining the sovereignty of Member
States in areas such as health care policy and social security where the
COLKER, supra note 79, at 4 ("The problem with the ADA's failed promises ... largely lies
with the Supreme Court rather than Congress's basic framework in enacting the ADA.").
231. But see Jill C. Anderson, Just Semantics: The Lost Readings of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 117 YALE LJ. 992 (2008).
232. See generally Chac6n Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467.
233. See id. 25.
234. Opinion of Advoc. Gen. Geelhoed, Chac6n Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, ' 46.
235. But see Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 115.
236. Opinion of Advoc. Gen. Geelhoed, Chac6n Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, 47.
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Treaty guarantees their sovereignty. 237 Legislative history is thus invoked
here to justify a narrow, textualist method of interpretation. The very
choice of the textualist method answers the first question of the referring
court about whether illness is part of disability. The second question,
whether illness can be interpreted as a separate ground, in a sense answers
itself. By labeling the enumeration of prohibited grounds in the provision
as exhaustive and interpreting it literally, the Court made all but unavoida-
ble the conclusion that illness is not a separately prohibited ground.2 38
Following the logic of AG Geelhoed's argument, if the legislature had
intended to include "mere" illness among the protected grounds, it would
have enumerated illness alongside other grounds.
The Court's (including AG Geelhoed's) narrow approach to then-Arti-
cle 13 is not baseless. That provision was indeed the object of heated delib-
erations among Member States, some of which-for instance, the
conservative U.K. government- adamantly opposed it. 2 3 9 This history in
part informed the Court's jurisprudence that denies then-Article 13 direct
effect. However, there are a few flaws in this narrow interpretation. First, it
is selective. Once the center of gravity shifts from then-Article 13 to the
Framework Directive itself, the Directive's own legislative history, as part of
the new disability policy that had been adopted by the Community in
1996, suggests a very different interpretation.2 40 Second, some of the
ECJ's landmark interpretive strategies expose the false necessity in the liter-
alist, narrow approach to then-Article 13. Any student of European law
familiar with the Court's teleological interpretation can state the form it
would have taken in this case. In line with its longstanding tradition, the
Court would have pointed out that then-Article 13 was only an instantia-
tion of the larger principle of equality, which demands that EU citizens be
granted protection from discrimination across the EU territory. 24 1 The
principle of nondiscrimination, as part of the larger principle of equality,
would have been an available-and indeed plausible-hook for a teleologi-
cal argument that would not have left Ms. Navas unprotected.2 42 Finally,
on the issue of illness as a separate ground, the Court's argument is weak-
ened when put to a comparative test. None of the comprehensive antidis-
crimination provisions in the national constitutions of the Member States
expressly mention illness among the prohibited grounds. Thus, it is just as
possible to conclude that illness is not mentioned expressly because it is
implicitly protected as part of disability, as it is to say that is was not
intended to be protected in the first place.
237. See Id. 1 54, 56.
238. See Chacon Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, 57.
239. See EVELYN ELLIS, EU AN-n-DISCRIMINATION LAW 13 n.59 (2005).
240. See de Btirca, supra note 104, at 219.
241. In fact, as we will see in the next section, the Court had relied on such an argu-
ment in an earlier preliminary reference concerning the meaning of the same directive.
See infra text accompanying notes 254-266.
242. The ECJ's recent equality jurisprudence indicates just such a broad approach.
For an analysis, see Andrea Eriksson, European Court of Justice: Broadening the Scope of
European Nondiscrimination Law, 7 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 731, 733 (2009).
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3. Jurisprudential Explanations: Equality's Path-Dependency
In the American context, scholars have at times explained the narrow
judicial interpretation of disability as part of a "judicial backlash" against
the ADA, which itself was part of a larger backlash against the positive
discrimination aspect of the jurisprudence of equality.24 3 Scholars have
debated to what extent the struggle for recognition of persons with disabili-
ties relies on a group model that borrows from the civil rights model not
only in terms of rhetoric and political strategy, but also in terms of the
jurisprudence of equality. Disability claims for reasonable accommodation
have sometimes been interpreted as tantamount to licenses for positive dis-
crimination. 2 44 Bereft of an objective basis on which to arbitrate compet-
ing rights arising from affirmative action claims, courts feared that their
institutional legitimacy would diminish whenever they attempted to admin-
ister the 'positive' aspects of the jurisprudence of race and gender equal-
ity. 24 5 Courts used their familiar framework to conceptualize disability
claims, and backlashed-preemptively-by limiting plaintiff standing.
In light of these developments, it might be surprising to recall the hope
of the ADA's initial supporters that the Act would breathe new life into the
jurisprudence of equality by, for instance, making stigma an element of
antidiscrimination analysis. 24 6 For all the important scholarly work on
disability discrimination and social structures, 2 47 it seems clear now that
the ADA has not only failed to transform equality jurisprudence, but that it
has been a victim of the conceptual framework that some hoped it would
change. The connection between reasonable accommodation and positive
discrimination helps to explain this state of affairs. Claims that the former
is an instance of the latter are debatable, and disability rights advocates
have sought to dispel them. 24 8 Although the formal ideal of equality, to
243. See Diller, supra note 25, at 39 (arguing that such claims came to courts at a time
when they were "decidedly inhospitable to expansive interpretations of civil rights pro-
tections in general").
244. See Scotch, Models, supra note 3, at 222 ("In some ways, the concept [of affirma-
tive action with respect to race] is analogous to the positive accommodations needed to
make employment, education, public accommodations, and other institutional spheres
truly accessible to Americans with disabilities.").
245. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1470, 1499 (2004).
246. Right after its adoption, many commentators had expressed the hope that the
ADA's broad, structural approach to equality-whose "regarded as" prong operational-
ized stigma-could itself shape equality jurisprudence in other nondiscrimination areas.
See Krieger, Foreword, supra note 71, at 6 ("The ADA promised to revive the concept of
stigma as a powerful hermeneutic for the elaboration and judicial application of Ameri-
can civil rights law.").
247. See generally Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State's Role in the
Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HA.v. L. REV. 1307 (2009); Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating
Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 839 (2008).
248. For an example from Europe, see Lisa Waddington, Case C-303/06, S. Coleman v.
Attridge Law and Steve Law, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of 17
July 2008, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 665, 679 (2009) ("The use of the term 'discrimina-
tion' in this context, albeit 'positive discrimination,' implies that non-disabled people
somehow lose out when the accommodation is provided to the disabled person, but that
this loss is justified and therefore allowed.").
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treat like cases alike, is so entrenched as to have become almost intuitive,
disability advocates have argued that equality also requires that different
cases be treated alike when the difference is irrelevant in the eyes of the
law. 249 They conclude that a commitment to equality may at times require
differential, as opposed to similar, treatment. 25 0 However, the jurispruden-
tial explanation need not show that association between disability claims
and positive discrimination is correct. Rather it is sufficient to show that
judges think it is correct and act accordingly. The question thus becomes
whether the equality-based explanation has an equivalent in the cases of
the ECJ. Specifically, is the Court's impairment-centered definition of disa-
bility in Navas a reaction to the Court's own equality jurisprudence?
Although it is difficult to find a perfect analogy with positive discrimi-
nation in the European context, the equality rationale does provide an
equivalent to the jurisprudential explanation both at a general, institu-
tional level as well as at the applied level of the jurisprudence of equality.
At the institutional level, the emphasis is on the ECJ's transition from its
early assertive stance, when it acted as a propeller of the European project,
towards a more minimalist approach. 25 ' The institutional reading of the
jurisprudential explanation seeks to illuminate the AG's rather subdued
reference in Navas to the "policy of equality" under then-Article 13 as an
example of the Court's recalibrated institutional self-understanding. 252 At
the applied level of the jurisprudence of equality, the jurisprudential expla-
nation points to the rather subdued equality analysis in Navas, explaining
it as a backpedaling from the Court's latest antidiscrimination decisions,
such as Mangold.2 53
For all its ingenuity, the jurisprudential explanation fails to account
for the turn to conceptualism in Navas. Even assuming arguendo that the
Court has entered a more moderate stage, where it does not reach by
default to the teleological method in its interpretative toolkit, the narrow
interpretation of disability is not part of that more moderate animus. First,
there is nothing moderate about the narrow judicial definition of disability.
Given the legislative history of the Framework Directive, the Court's inter-
pretation represented a bold, radical departure from what all accounts
indicate was the intended aim of the authors of the directive. Second, and
249. See Diller, supra note 25, at 23 ("The ADA's requirement of 'reasonable accom-
modation' rests on the idea that in some circumstances people must be treated differ-
ently from others in order to be treated equally.").
250. See id. at 40 ("Many of the problems emerging from judicial decisions concern-
ing the ADA stem from the ADA's reliance on a vision of equality that is particularly
controversial-the principle that differential treatment, rather than the same treatment,
is necessary to create equality.").
251. See Eriksson, supra note 242, at 753.
252. This approach departs from the adopted textualism insofar as it ignores the refer-
ence to the "principle of equal treatment" in Article 1 of the Framework Directive. ("The
purpose of this Directive is to lay down a general framework for combating discrimina-
tion on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards
employment and occupation, with a view to putting into effect in the Member States the
principle of equal treatment."). Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 12, art. 1.
253. Case C-144/04, Mangold v. Helm, 2005 E.C.R. 1-09981.
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more importantly, the Court's subsequent interpretations of the disability
provisions in the Framework Directive fail to support the judicial shift from
bold teleology to strategic moderation. Contrary to the claims of the juris-
prudential explanation, Navas represents a departure from the Court's
equality cases. That departure can be explained on grounds peculiar to
disability.
In Mangold, the Court held that "the principle of non-discrimination
on grounds of age must ... be regarded as a general principle of Commu-
nity law."'25 4 To the disbelief (and excitement) of the academy, 2 55 it noted
that "the source of the actual principle underlying the prohibition" can be
found in the "various international instruments and the constitutional tra-
ditions of the Member States" and held that national courts have a duty to
set aside national law that violates this principle, even before the period of
implementation of a directive has expired.2 56 According to the jurispru-
dential explanation, the rather tepid commitment to equality in Navas is a
reaction to these earlier statements. However, a subsequent preliminary ref-
erence under the Framework Directive undermines that argument.
In Coleman v. Attridge Law, the ECJ answered a preliminary reference
question from an employment tribunal in the UK to interpret whether the
Framework Directive extends its protection to employees discriminated
against on the basis of their association with a person with disability.
25 7
Ms. Coleman claimed that her employer discriminated against her because
of her disabled newborn, for whom she was a primary caretaker.25 8 Since
according to the textual interpretation of the UK Disability Discrimination
Act of 1995, prior to changes to incorporate the 2000 Directive, national
law did not protect discrimination by association, the question arose
whether the incorporation of the Directive extended antidiscrimination
protection to persons such as the plaintiff in the main action. The ECJ held
that it did.2 59 Even if the text of the Directive is silent on this point, the
Court found that the principle of non-discrimination protects employees
treated less favorably because of the disability of their children whose care
they provide. 2 60 The Court's approach explicitly rejected calls for a narrow
interpretation of the principle of equal treatment on the ground that such
an interpretation would hamper the social and economic integration of dis-
abled persons. 2 6 1
254. Id. 75.
255. See Alan Dashwood, From Van Duyn to Mangold via Marshall: Reducing Direct
Effect to Absurdity?, 9 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 81, 108 (2007); Sebastian Kreb-
ber, The Social Rights Approach of the European Court of Justice to Enforce European
Employment Law, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 377, 381 (2006); Marlene Schmidt, The
Principle of Non-discrimination in Respect of Age: Dimensions of the ECJ's Mangold Judg-
ment, 7 GERMAN LJ. 505 (2006).
256. See Mangold, 2005 E.C.R. 1-09981, 1 74, 76; see also Case C-555/07,
Kicukdeveci v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, 2 COMMON MKT. L. REP. 33 (2010).
257. Case C-303/06, Coleman v. Attridge Law, 2008 E.C.R. 1-05603.
258. Id. 9 22.
259. Id. 56.
260. See id. ' 38.
261. See id. TT 42-43, 47.
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In a forceful Opinion, AG Maduro urged the Court to reach this result
and laid down the decision's normative foundations. In stark contrast to
AG Geelhoed in Navas, AG Maduro invoked the principle of equality, refer-
ring to it as "not merely a political ideal and aspiration but one of the
fundamental principles of Community law." 26 2 Moreover, he identified
the normative aim of Article 13 and the Directive as the protection of the
dignity and autonomy of persons who belong to the suspect classifications
listed in the text. 263 Denial of protection against discrimination by associ-
ation would harm persons with disabilities by limiting the protection of
their caregivers. 264 As AG Maduro noted in his Opinion, "[p]eople belong-
ing to certain groups are often more vulnerable than the average person, so
they have come to rely on individuals with whom they are closely associ-
ated for help in their effort to lead a life according to the fundamental
choices they have made. '2 65 The normative interplay between vulnerabil-
ity and dignity plays an important role in the AG's opinion. After establish-
ing that Article 13 expresses the Community's commitment to equality,
and that the values underlying equality are human dignity and autonomy,
the opinion concludes that "[tlhe aim of Article 13 and of the Directive is to
protect the dignity and autonomy of persons belonging to those suspect
classifications. 2
66
However one might label this analysis, it certainly does not portray a
court retreating into a minimalist stance. To the contrary, it is as assertive
as any of the Court's earlier bold, teleological pronouncements. The puzzle
is how to square its approach here to that in Navas. Ms. Navas was also in a
vulnerable situation. Having been laid off from her catering firm, she was
sick at home without the prospect of returning to a job when she recovered,
if she recovered fully. What the AG pointed out in Coleman in the context
of getting a job surely applies in the context of keeping a job: "it is of funda-
mental significance for every individual, not merely for as a means of earn-
ing one's living but also as an important way of self-fulfillment and
realization of one's potential."'2 6 7 To be fired exclusively because of a
262. Opinion of Advoc. Gen. Maduro, Coleman, 2008 E.C.R. 1-05603, 9 8.
263. The AG Opinion in Navas refers to the "policy" of equality. Opinion of Advoc.
Gen. Geelhoed, Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, c 53. The AG in Coleman, on the other
hand, speaks forcefully of the "principle" of equality. See Opinion of Advoc. Gen.
Maduro, Coleman, 2008 E.C.R. 1-05603, 9 8.
264. In AG Maduro's view, the Directive does not protect an employee from being
treated less favorably only because of her own disability; it is sufficient that she be
treated less favorably because of "disability" -hers or others. See Opinion of Advoc.
Gen. Maduro, Coleman, 2008 E.C.R. 1-05603, 9 23.
265. Id. 9 14. It is noteworthy that this statement contains none of the paternalism of
the charity model according to which persons with disabilities must rely on others. AG
Maduro in fact emphasizes common human vulnerability and asserts that the legal
regime that protects people's fundamental choices also respects their dignity.
266. Id. T9 8-10. (arguing that the principle of human dignity necessitates that "indi-
viduals and political institutions must not act in a way that denies the intrinsic impor-
tance of every human life").
267. See id. 1 11 ("Access to employment and professional development are of funda-
mental significance for every individual, not merely as a means of earning one's living
but also as an important way of self-fulfillment and realisation of one's potential.").
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health condition reduces one to a lower status and denies her equal oppor-
tunities for self-fulfillment. Sometimes employers discriminate against
employees whose medical condition impacts on their public lives because
they don't want to have them around. Other times, they do it because it is
too costly or too burdensome to work out accommodations for them.
Whatever the employer's reasons, why should the Directive be interpreted
as requiring anything other than similarity of treatment, namely
prohibition?
Interestingly, the AG's opinion in Coleman more or less ignored the
Navas decision, or at least its justification. The Court's judgment mentions
it by way of answering the submissions of Member States that relied on
Navas to convince the Court not to expand protection under the Directive
ratione personae or ratione materiae beyond the explicit provisions of the
text. The Court rejected this interpretation and pointed out that Navas did
not hold that the principle of equal treatment should be interpreted strictly
within the scope of the Directive. 268 According to the Coleman Court,
Navas interpreted narrowly only the protected classes to which the Direc-
tive extends generous protection under the principle of equal protection.
26 9
This is a surprising argument. First, the Court's medical interpretation of
disability in Navas violated the basic dialectic of legal interpretation,
according to which the architecture of a text might provide the pathway by
which its central concepts need to be interpreted. That is what respect for
a text means. In the case of a law, structural interpretation-reading one
provision in light of all others-helps to identify the normative spirit of the
text. Even a reader unconcerned with the Court's departure from legisla-
tive history cannot help but see the disconnect between the spirit of the
Directive and the Court's definition of disability. Second, the Court's own
interpretation of Navas, combined with its holding and justification in
Coleman, refutes the jurisprudential explanation. It was not the Court's
timidity toward the claims of equality that explain the Navas decision.
The jurisprudence of equality does not explain the narrow definition
of disability in Navas. We will not understand that definition better by
approaching it through the lens of equality, at least not in this doctrinal
way. A different explanation is necessary. In this subsection, I have dis-
cussed and rejected three grounds for the narrow medical model of disabil-
ity. These grounds, which are endogenous to legal reasoning, explained
the turn to conceptualism by reference to doctrine, the method of interpre-
tation, and the jurisprudence of equality. I turn next to a brief discussion
of three possible exogenous explanations.
B. Exogenous Explanations
This section introduces three explanations of the judicial turn to con-
ceptualism that are exogenous, so to speak, to the internal logic of legal
reasoning in the cases that marked the turn. The explanations focus on the
268. See Coleman, 2008 E.C.R. 1-05603, '1 46.
269. See id.
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larger ideological currents and crosscurrents that have characterized the
political and legal debates surrounding the protection of persons with disa-
bilities (ideological explanations) and, more briefly, on the institutional
actors (sociological explanations) and the relations among them (institu-
tional explanations). As in the preceding section, these are explanations
first articulated in the American context and whose cogency can be tested
when put to a nuanced comparative test. Finding European equivalents to
this set of exogenous explanations will be more difficult than the explana-
tions discussed in the previous section. In addition to obvious differences
in the political and institutional environments in the U.S. and the EU, diffi-
culties stem from these explanations resting on hypotheses that can be
tested only over periods of time longer than the one which has passed since
the implementation of the Framework Directive. The rich experience of
litigation under the ADA makes possible the fuller articulation of these
explanations in the American context. Nevertheless, even if some of their
European equivalents are by necessity incomplete, understanding the judi-
ciary's approach requires at least the specification of these hypotheses.
This section shows that exogenous explanations do not, either severally or
together, offer full and cogent explanations of the judicial turn to
conceptualism.
The following analysis can be read "deconstructively," as a study of
strategies the European Court of Justice deployed in rationalizing its pre-
deliberative outcome. Seeking to explain a judicial outcome by reaching to
elements outside judicial reasoning might signal that the outcome itself is
the expression of bias to the extent that the reasons supporting the out-
come simply cover judges' initial preferences or intuitions about the case.
Such a deconstructive reading is helpful but likely implausible and in any
event insufficient. After learning whatever deconstruction can teach, one
might still want to know why the judicial preferences and intuitions
aligned the way they did -in our case, why they aligned with the narrow
interpretation of disability. And that is a question that the explanations
discussed below cannot fully answer.
1. Ideological Explanations: The Market and the Social as a Political
Double Helix
An impairment-centered definition of disability, in the employment
context, narrows the class of persons who can claim protection and frees
employers to rely on their market analysis when making employment deci-
sions. For instance, Ms. Navas' employer can decide that replacing her
with temporary workers is more costly for the business than paying her
financial compensation for an unlawful dismissal. Put differently, employ-
ers can act based on cost-benefit analysis more often than if they were
bound to respect their employees' nondiscrimination rights. Does this
market-ideology reading explain the narrow interpretation of disability?
As always with ideological arguments, one must distinguish a simple-
or simplistic-version from a more sophisticated one. According to the for-
mer, judges are part of a conservative elite that furthers the interests of
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their caste by enhancing the economic power of employers over and above
the rights of vulnerable employees, whom they leave at the mercy of not
particularly merciful market forces. The problem with this approach is
that judges are not always, or even often, drawn from the privileged elite
and, even if they were, it would hardly follow that they would therefore feel
inclined to protect their caste. In the more nuanced version, as applied in
the case of disability litigation, the ideological implications of judicial deci-
sions are seen as unintended consequences of the rhetoric deployed in the
political genesis of disability antidiscrimination statutes. Two different
grounds form the double helix of that rhetoric: equality of opportunity and
market efficiency. The ideological explanation places central emphasis on
courts' unwillingness or incapacity to disentangle the two grounds. Failure
to disentangle these grounds means that conflicts of interpretation and
application of disability statutes will be fueled by deeper conflicts of these
values. The ideological lens shows that, as between equality and market
efficiency, courts will favor the market.
Both equal opportunity and market efficiency figured prominently in
how actors across the political spectrum converged in their support for the
disability legislation on both sides of the Atlantic. As we saw in Part 1,
legislation for the protection of persons with disabilities enjoyed large
bipartisan support.2 70 This was true both in the U.S. and the European
Community, although for different reasons. In the American context, the
explanation has to do with market-based arguments that convinced con-
servative Republicans to throw their support behind that legislation. It is
economically inefficient, this argument goes, when persons with disabili-
ties who are able to work are denied that opportunity and instead receive
welfare benefits. In the context of the European Community, the explana-
tion has to do with its transcendent economic purpose and nature. Yet,
despite the different origins in the preeminence of the economic rationale
for disability nondiscrimination legislation, the ideological explanation
seeks to demonstrate that the judicial turn to conceptualism is a function
of economic rationality being deployed to "cover" the principle of equal
opportunity. In what follows, I briefly present the different roots of the
economic rationale and then investigate the soundness of the ideological
explanation.
Bipartisan political support for disability legislation represented the
convergence of political parties and institutions acting on different motiva-
tions. In the U.S., it was assumed that the political left would support disa-
bility legislation, at least after the struggle for recognition of persons with
disabilities followed, in both claims and rhetoric, the template of struggles
for recognition of previous civil rights and women's rights movements,
which the left had supported.2 7 1 More surprising, however, was the sup-
port for disability legislation from the political right. Apart from serendipi-
tous stories of political leaders supporting the plight of disabled
270. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
271. See SKRENTNY, supra note 58, at 269.
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individuals for personal reasons, the political right was driven to embrace
the cause of disability rights by traditional arguments for market effi-
ciency. 272 It was a market inefficiency to keep unemployed persons with
disabilities at home on social security payroll, if they were perfectly capa-
ble of working.273 While the rhetoric of market efficiency did not come
easily to the political left, or to some disability rights advocates, embracing
it seemed like a worthwhile tradeoff since it delivered broad bipartisan sup-
port that guaranteed legislative success. Market efficiency and the equality
of opportunity rationale became intertwined in the political origin of the
bill.274
The market and social reasoning also provide the political double
helix of disability policy at the European supranational level. The Directive
expressly mentions the principle of equal opportunity in Article 1.275 The
Commission's 1996 strategy, which sanctioned the social model and
marked a turning point in the Community disability policy, mentions that
"[iun economic terms, structural exclusion and discrimination on the
grounds of disability also sap labor market efficiency. A market that struc-
turally excludes a significant proportion of its human resources cannot be
described as efficient, much less fair. Society as a whole (including the
taxpayer) loses out when ability is not duly acknowledged and enabled to
work. '276 Under this model, it is typical to find references to persons with
disabilities as "a much-underused source of labor in Europe, which could
contribute to overall economic growth. '277 The rationale of market effi-
ciency is intertwined with the principle of equal opportunity. For
instance, the official action plan for 2008-2009 mentions "the growing
economic dimension: [t]he exclusion of people with disabilities from the
labor market is a serious concern, from the perspective of equal opportuni-
ties. There is also an economic dimension to this problem: faced with a
272. A number of critiques from academics argue that the ADA does not promote
market efficiency. See Scotch, Models, supra note 3, at 219 (citing Carolyn L. Weaver,
Incentives versus Controls in Federal Disability Policy, in DISABILITY AND WORK: INCENTIVES,
RIGHTS, AND OPPORTUNITIES 6-7 (Carolyn L. Weaver ed., 1991) ("[The ADA] includes in
the protected population people who, in an economic sense, are not as productive or do
not make the same contribution to profitability of the firm as other people with the same
qualifications .... While promoting the employment of this much broader group may be
a highly desirable social goal, the antidiscrimination-reasonable accommodation
approach is a costly and inefficient way of doing so and is likely to have highly undesir-
able distributional consequences.").
273. See SKRENTNY, supra note 58, at 267; Burke, supra note 15, at 162; Scotch, Models,
supra note 3, at 218-221; Scotch, Politics and Policy, supra note 68, at 394-397 (discuss-
ing policy advocacy in a conservative era).
274. See Americans with Disabilities Act, Preamble, 9[ 5.
275. See Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 12, art. 1.
276. See 1996 EC Disability Strategy, supra note 54, at 9 12. The social model figured
prominently even before 1996. For a description of the economic justification of non-
discrimination on grounds of disability in the early stages of Community action in this
area, see Gerard Quinn, The European Social Charter and EU Anti-Discrimination Law in
the Field of Disability: Two Gravitational Fields with One Common Purpose, in SOCIAL
RIGHTS IN EUROPE 279 (Grainne de Birca & Bruno de Witte eds., 2005).
277. See Commission Staff Working Paper: Disability Mainstreaming in the European
Employment Strategy, at 5, COM (2005) EMCO/1 1/290605 (Jul. 1, 2005).
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shrinking workforce resulting from demographic change, the 2006 Spring
European Council highlighted the need to make the most of the untapped
potential of many people excluded from the labor market and identified
disabled people as one of the key priority groups." 2 78
The prominence of market explanations alongside equality can also to
some extent be explained on non-ideological grounds. The Community's
initial economic aims created a path dependency that lives on in the lan-
guage of policy. Moreover there is the lingering concern with how policies
fit within the competencies scheme of a Community of limited powers.
The prominence of the market rationale points to that dimension of disa-
bility antidiscrimination policies aimed at bringing them squarely within
the Community's competence. It is therefore unsurprising to find a struc-
tural, competence layer in both arguments about "the policy of equality"
2 79
as well as in arguments about "the principle of equality." 280 The same is
true, and largely for similar reasons, about the language and arguments in
which the Community's gender equality policies have been cast.
28 1
The explanatory power of the ideological perspective is nevertheless
significant. For instance, it points to the mixture of conflicting political
rationales and their corresponding political values, to understand state-
ments such as the AG's in Navas to the effect that "there is even less
room ... for widening the scope of Article 13 EC by relying on the general
policy of equality." 28 2 Article 13 would have had a larger radiating effect if
the AG had invoked the principle of equality. 28 3 From an ideologically-
focused prism, on display here are the effects of how the market efficiency
rationale shapes-or corrupts, in the language of social systems theory-
278. Commission Communication: Situation of Disabled People in the Enlarged European
Union: The European Action Plan 2008-2009, at 3, COM (2007) 738 final (November 26,
2007); see also Commission Communication: Situation of Disabled People in the Enlarged
European Union: The European Action Plan 2006-2007, at 3, (COM (2005) 604 final
(Nov. 28, 2005) ("Given the current demographic situation, the economic potential of
disabled people and the contribution they can make to economic and employment
growth must be further activated on the basis of the Social Agenda for 2005-2010").
279. For instance, AG Geelhoed in Navas, after noting that the legislative history and
grammar of the Treaty do not support an expansive definition of disability, dedicated a
more substantial part of his Opinion to policy arguments, warning against the "poten-
tially far-reaching economic and financial consequences" of an expansive definition of
disability." Opinion of Advoc. Gen. Geelhoed, Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, 'I 49, 51. In
his view, such a definition would interfere with the Member States' sovereign decisions
about the allocation of available public resources, thus impacting on areas such as
employment policy and social welfare in which the Community has mostly complemen-
tary powers. See id. '1 52.
280. See Opinion of Advoc. Gen. Maduro, Coleman, 2008 E.C.R. 1-05603, 8.
281. See Burke, supra note 15, at 168 ("[The] redefinition of disability as an issue of
economic competitiveness has a venerable tradition at the European Union: it parallels
the primary rationale for EU-level action on gender equality that began in the 1970s.").
282. Opinion of Advoc. Gen. Geelhoed, Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, ' 53.
283. The Court had previously relied on the general principle of nondiscrimination
in Community law, for instance in the context of age discrimination. See Mangold, 2005
E.C.R. 1-09981; David L. Hosking, A High Bar for EU Disability Rights, 36 INDUs. LJ. 228,
231 (2007).
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the equality rationale in the genealogy of disability policy. 28 4
The ideological explanation captures something important about the
legal implications of political rhetoric surrounding the judicial interpreta-
tion of disability antidiscrimination statutes. This explanation supple-
ments endogenous accounts by showing that the market rationale coexists
with the equal opportunity rationale in the formulation of disability policy.
Part of its claim must also be that the judicial turn to conceptualism is the
effect of the market rationale normatively corrupting the equality rationale.
But it falls short as a comprehensive explanation of that phenomenon. The
ideological explanation does not show why courts focus on the definition
of the protected class, rather than seeking to cut back on antidiscrimina-
tion protection at the discrimination stage of the analysis. The same ideo-
logical biases would presumably manifest themselves in the later stage of
litigation, when courts must determine whether the employer discrimi-
nated against the disabled employee. We have seen that many cases do not
even reach this analysis since they end at the stage of determining whether
the plaintiff meets the statutory definition of disability. Why, then, do
courts focus their analysis at that step? One possible answer, consistent
with the ideological explanation, would be that the definitional focus gives
judicial analysis at least the appearance of ideological neutrality. But that
answer still does not capture what in the conceptual structure of disability
protection makes the definitional moment a pressure point that could be
exploited: why, under pressure -ideological or not-does the model break
at that particular point? Without an answer to that question, the ultimate
explanation of the resilience of the medical model in the narrow interpreta-
tion of disability remains elusive.
2. Sociological Explanations: The Vagaries of Professional Judgment
The resilience of the medicalized model of disability in the judgments
of American courts is sometimes explained as a spillover effect of broader
developments within the legal and political system. According to this
account, the Supreme Court's 1999 decisions represented the judicial rati-
fication of the ADA's implementation guidelines. To understand the resili-
ence of the model, one needs to take into consideration the mindsets and
professional experiences of those who drafted the guidelines. 2 85 Specifi-
cally, there were two such implementation regulations, one issued by the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the other by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). 286 The DOJ regulations were similar
to the ones that that had directed the Section 504 regulations implementing
284. See Case C-217/91, Spain v. Commission, 1993 E.C.R. 1-3953, 37.
285. This sociological analysis also applies to the training of employment lawyers that
later litigated ADA cases. These training sessions focused to a great extent on concep-
tual issues regarding the definition of disability. See Feldblum, supra note 18, at 138.
286. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35726 (July 26, 1991) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630) (EEOC
regulations); 56 Fed. Reg. 35544 (July 26, 1991) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36) (DOJ
regulations).
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the 1973 Rehabilitation Act.28 7 The EEOC regulations, however, departed
from the Section 504 regulations in two important respects. Those regula-
tions "included, for the first time, a definition of the term 'substantially
limits"' and required, for the first time in disability jurisprudence, an indi-
vidualized assessment to determine whether a person met the statutory
definition of disability. 28 8 The EEOC regulations also introduced regula-
tions on the major life activity of "working," which commentators regarded
as remnants of the medical model whose traces in this definition are still
visible today. 289 Thus, according to the sociological account, the narrow
interests of professionals in charge of overseeing the ADA's implementation
prevailed over the drafters' intentions. 2 90 This sociological account help-
fully expands the relevant framework of analysis. However, the sociologi-
cal argument cannot tell the whole story. It matters greatly who the actors
are, beyond and including judges, but that is only one of the many things
that matter. The sociological account does not explain what made the defi-
nition of disability malleable because the same outcomes would have been
achieved should implementation regulations and courts have decided to
interpret the discrimination prong of the disability analysis narrowly.
Of all the explanations discussed in Part IlI, the sociological explana-
tion is perhaps the one most difficult to find equivalences between the U.S.
and Europe, at least so long as the conversation about the latter remains
focused at the supranational level. In the absence of implementation regu-
lations at the EU level, there are not enough elements to construct analo-
gies. Such analogies would perhaps be possible if we reached into the
national bureaucracies. But it is simply too soon to tell what effects the
Directive has had at that level, given that national cases involving the inter-
pretation of disability have not yet found their way to the national courts of
last resort, in light of the ECJ's decision in Navas.
3. Institutional Explanations: In Search of Systemic Equilibrium
Finally, there is an institutional reading of the conflict between courts
and Congress regarding the ADA's interpretation of disability. From this
287. See Feldblum, supra note 18, at 134. The only medical impairment they
addressed specifically was HIV, which as we have seen, courts had encountered in the
1980s. See id. at 135.
288. See id. at 135-36 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (1999); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630,
App. at 349 (1999)).
289. See Feldblum, supra note 18, at 143 "The resonance of the requirement that an
individual be unable to work, in a whole range of jobs no less, in order to meet the ADA's
definition of disability reflects the staying power of the historical image of a 'disabled
person' as a person who is unable to work and unable to function in society. This imag-
ine may well make intuitive sense to people because society does, indeed, provide cash
payments for those who qualify for disability benefit plans. The idea, however, that the
ADA was designed to prohibit discrimination against people with disabilities who can
work, and hence, for example, are not seeking disability cash benefits, does not seem to
have penetrated the minds of many judges." Id. at 143.
290. See Krieger, Afterword, supra note 17, at 501 ("[F]ew people outside of [a] rela-
tively small circle, including federal judges empowered to interpret the ADA, understand
the social model of disability or adhere to the norms, values, and interpretive perspec-
tives it was designed to advance.").
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perspective, Sutton's unambiguous rejection of legislative history was an
institutional "power grab."29 1 Using the same logic, the 2008 ADA Amend-
ments Act represents Congress' comeback. It has often been noted that
"[a] lack of visible opposition to disability rights proposals is a pattern one
sees in all the polities in which such proposals have reached the legislative
agenda. '29 2 When combined with the ideological explanation, the institu-
tional account shows how the ideological balance and systemic equilib-
rium are restored on institutional grounds. What this account has a hard
time explaining is why courts chose the battlefield of the definition of disa-
bility to flex their muscles at Congress. And that question does not have
an institutional answer.
It is quite difficult to find an equivalent of this explanation in the Euro-
pean context. The argument that the ECJ's decision in Navas was meant to
restore the institutional equilibrium by countering powerful social move-
ments, who had enshrined their agenda in the Framework Directive, rings
hollow. The European system has other mechanisms for restoring institu-
tional equilibrium when imbalances are present. There is, however, a dif-
ferent way of framing the institutional argument as to fall squarely within a
larger debate about the relationship between courts and political institu-
tions. This perspective points to the institutional consequences of judicial
intervention, even when those interventions are not motivated by strategic
ideological action. Thus, even when courts do not act on any ulterior
motives, their interventions inflict damage to the extent they undermine
regulatory experimentation. 293 Navas illustrates the danger of judicial
intervention. In just one case, the ECJ managed to undermine political
efforts for a new disability policy that had been underway in Europe since
1996. Moreover, its intervention entrenched an autonomous and unitary
"European meaning of disability. 294 Even if that definition is a floor, and
not a ceiling, the low floor changed the disability policy landscape. 295 The
Court's decision was not informed by the rich history of thinking about
disability regulations, which had informed the Framework Directive.
291. See COLKER, supra note 79, at 201-202 ("In Sutton, [the Court] has told Congress
that the Court is entirely uninterested in the record Congress creates while drafting leg-
islation. These conflicting methodological approaches to examining the work of Con-
gress can be understood only as power grab by the Court at the expense of Congress.
Ultimately, individuals with disabilities are the losers in the separation-of-powers
battle.").
292. Burke, supra note 15, at 167 (emphasis in original).
293. The new governance literature makes this point in intricate detail. See, e.g., Neil
Walker & Grdinne de B~irca, Reconceiving Law & New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
519 (2007). For an argument about experimentalism in the European context, see
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1998); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights:
How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004).
294. See supra text accompanying note 154.
295. See, e.g., de Burca, supra note 8, at text accompanying notes 48-50 (discussing
the changes in the Commission's position in negotiating the UN Convention on the
Protection of Persons with Disabilities); supra text accompanying notes 160-161 (docu-
menting the reaction of the disability rights movement, specifically the call for a compre-
hensive disability directive).
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According to this interpretation of the sociological explanation, much is
lost when courts intervene in the legislative process in this uninformed
manner. However, this explanation disregards that enforceable rights need
independent institutions such as courts to enforce them. As we will see in
Part IV, framing the question as one of rights has been crucial in the evolu-
tion of the self-understanding of the disability rights movement. This
explains why calls to action after Navas have not demanded that courts be
sidestepped, but only that they act to enforce the political program embed-
ded in the Framework Directive.
2 96
IV. Impairment, Discrimination, and the Legal Construction of
Disability
The explanations discussed in Part Ill-doctrinal, interpretative, juris-
prudential, ideological, institutional and sociological- are insufficient to
understand the staying power of the medicalized approach to disability in
judicial decisions. In this section, I seek to provide the missing parts of the
explanation. I turn to the social model itself and specifically to the inter-
play between, on the one hand, its conceptualization of illness, impair-
ment, and disability and, on the other hand, the broader argumentative
strategies that the disability rights movement deployed in its struggle for
recognition of the equal status of persons with disabilities.2 9 7 As we will
see, it is difficult to disentangle the substance of the model's main claims
from the argumentative strategies deployed in advocating for disability
reform both in Europe and in the United States.
The analysis is divided into two sections. In Part IV.A., I argue that
failure to provide an account of medical impairments left courts bereft of
guidance on how to interpret disability according to the social model and
made them seek refuge in the more familiar territory of the medicalized
approach. The decision to leave medical impairments under-theorized was
not an accident. It was, rather, the response of social model theorists to the
perceived risk that an analogy between impairments and illness would
legitimize the dominion of medical expertise and perpetuate socially disa-
bling assumptions about normality. This argumentative strategy distorted
the claims to recognition of persons with disabilities. In Part IV.B., I sug-
gest that the medicalized approach is the effect of convergence between
courts' institutional concerns with administrability of potentially sweeping
296. The above observations refer to the inter-institutional dimension. But there are
also relevant intra-institutional aspects. For instance, administrative issues such as an
unmanageably large docket or the lack of built-in scrutiny in the practice of unanimous
decisions are also relevant. As was mentioned in Part II, the lack of even an inkling of
the social model in the Navas judgment is striking. See supra text accompanying notes
155-156. The assumption that reasonable accommodation is a form of positive dis-
crimination in Coleman is another. See Coleman, 2008 E.C.R. 1-05603, 42.
297. See also BAGENSTOS, supra note 24, at 54 (commenting on the Supreme Court's
definition-of-disability cases, noting that "[tihose decisions are deeply flawed but they
do not belong to the Supreme Court alone. Instead, they flow directly from the minor-
ity-group model and the independence frame that disability activists themselves formu-
lated and promoted.").
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disability statutes, on the one hand, and the social movements' fears that
only a strong social discrimination approach could create the shared politi-
cal consciousness necessary for reform, on the other hand. I present this
as an explanatory account that does not aim to justify the survival of nar-
row, medicalized definitions of disability.
One caveat is necessary before we proceed. My argument in this sec-
tion refers to the social model and assumes that the social model informed
the claims of the disability rights movement(s). However, as Samuel Bagen-
stos has recently shown, the social movement, at least in the United States,
has spoken in different-and oftentimes conflicting-voices. 29 8 Some disa-
bility advocates have supported a minority-based approach whereas others
have argued that disability is a matter of degree. Some strands of the move-
ment have embraced the welfare policies for persons with disabilities,
others have opposed them; some have been reluctant to criticize the ascen-
dency of medical professionals, others yet have spoken viscerally against
the claims of medical experts over the lives of persons with disabilities.299
These positions seem so fundamentally different that one can reasonably
question their unity. Anticipating precisely such questions, Bagenstos
traces their commonality to a shared allegiance to the social model. He
writes that "the one position that approaches consensus within the move-
ment . . . [is] the endorsement of a social rather than a medical model of
disability. '30 0 The social model is, in this view, compatible with the wide
diversity of projects that characterized the social movement for disability
rights. Yet for that to be true, the social model would need to be more like a
vague insight about the social rootedness of disability than a full-blown,
articulate model. That seems to be Bagenstos's view, and the reason why
he focuses the analysis on the different projects of disability rights advo-
cates, rather than on the social model that underpins these overall social
movements. I take a different approach and focus instead on the social
model, and especially on its early theorists, and only tangentially on the
diverging claims of the disability rights movement. If one seeks to under-
stand the staying power of the medicalized model, especially in judicial
definitions of disability, I believe that this approach is preferable. Rather
than a vague insight, the social model appears as a set of claims whose
intellectual origins explain and influence over time; it adds the missing
elements to the previously discussed explanations for the staying power of
the medicalized model in judicial definitions of disability.
A. Conceptual Forensics: Medical Impairments
Medical impairments remain central to the definition of disability even
in regulatory regimes purportedly grounded on a conception of disability
as the result of social discrimination, rather than illness. The ECJ inter-
preted the silence of the European Framework Directive and defined disa-
298. See id. at 12-33.
299. See id.
300. Id. at 13.
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bility as "a limitation which results in particular from physical, mental or
psychological impairments and which hinders the participation of the per-
son concerned in professional life." 30 1 The ADA's current disability prong
defines a person with a disability as someone with "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities
of such individual." 30 2 As we have seen in Part I, the drafters of the ADA
did not consider it necessary to modify this definition, which was taken
almost ad litteram from the 1973 Rehabilitation Act.30 3 The 2008 ADA
Amendments Act (ADAAA) also leaves that definition unmodified. Impair-
ments would have remained central to the definition of disability even in
the bolder proposals for the amendments, which were eventually deemed
politically unpalatable.30 4 Those bolder proposals would have defined dis-
ability as a present, past, or perceived impairment.30 5 I argue below that
even those proposals would have been insufficient to deliver the kind of
reform for which disability advocates hope. In the American case of a stat-
utory definition, or the European case, where the highest court stipulates
the definition in order to fill a gap in legislation, the question of the subse-
quent interpretation of medical impairment is consequential. The defini-
tion of disability itself should provide a guide to how to interpret medical
impairments.
Consider the options available to courts in interpreting the concept of
medical impairments from the perspective of both the medical and social
models. The latter interpretation centers on society's discriminatory reac-
tion to the existence-or perception-of a present-or past-impairment.
The social model interpretation emphasizes the social effects of impair-
ments. By contrast, the medical model underscores the relevance of factors
intrinsic to the medical impairment. For instance, in the United States, the
EEOC interpretation guidelines recommended the consideration of "(i) the
nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) the duration or expected dura-
tion of the impairment; (iii) the permanent or long-term impact, or the
expected permanent or long-term impact of or resulting from the impair-
301. Chacon Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, 1 43. The Court here followed AG Geelhoed,
who endorsed this approach. He argued that the emphasis is on the "serious functional
limitations (disabilities) due to physical, psychological or mental afflictions." Opinion
of Advoc. Gen. Geelhoed, Chacon Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, cj 76. The act of discrimi-
nation is a reaction to the social effects of the medical condition, and it is severable from
it: "the health problem as cause of the functional limitation should in principle be distin-
guished from that limitation" Id. ' 77.
302. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Moreover, and as we have seen, the Court's interpretation
of the present-disability prong, and specifically its focus on the "major life activities"
prong at the expense of the other elements of the definition had the effect of actually
folding "the later two spikes into the first spur so that the question of defining whether
or not a plaintiff has a disability is determined almost exclusively by disputes about the
loss of a major life activity." Hahn, supra note 178, at 171. Hahn goes on to argue that
judges' confusion over impairment and disability led to the neglect of the second and
third prong of the ADA definition of disability. See id.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
304. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 24, at 45.
305. See id. at 44.
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ment."30 6 This focus on the nature, rather than the social effect, of medical
impairments goes against the tenets of the social model. The question
arises, how have the theorists of the social model attempted to steer the
interpretation of medical impairments away from their nature and to their
social effects?
Evidence suggests that little was done in this regard. Social model
theorists shied away from theorizing about medical impairments alto-
gether. Indeed, because definitions of disability made either direct refer-
ence to medical impairment, or were interpreted by judges to imply such
references, courts failed to theorize about medical impairments, which
explains in part why the medicalized approach to disability survived in
judicial interpretations of the definition of disability. What then explains
failure to theorize about medical impairments within the broader context
of the social model?
This failure was not accidental, but rather the outcome of strategic
choices. Social model theorists acknowledged the need to theorize about
medical impairments but only within a comprehensive social theory of dis-
ability, and not in the confines of the social model. While one should
always be cautious not to overlook differences on this point among social
model theorists, many of its early advocates believed that including a the-
ory of impairment in the social model could undermine the model's politi-
cal effectiveness. As one of the model's prominent theorists put it, "[t]he
denial of impairment has not, in reality, been a denial at all. Rather it has
been a pragmatic attempt to identify and address issues that can be
changed through collective action rather than medical or other professional
treatment. ' 30 7 This pragmatic political awareness was more than an addi-
tional strategic layer to a self-standing normative argument; it pervaded the
normative core of the social model. That core, and the political strategy for
conveying the claims effectively, remained deeply entangled.
The key for understanding their entanglement is to recall that the pro-
ject of transformation that social model theorists envisaged was-and to
some extent still is-comprehensive, not piecemeal. The wholesale shift
from an individual to a social approach is premised on disconnecting disa-
bility from illness: "The achievement of the disability movement has been
to break the link between our bodies and our social situation, and to focus
on the real cause of disability, i.e. discrimination and prejudice. To men-
tion biology, to admit pain, to confront our impairments, has been to risk
the oppressors seizing on evidence that disability is 'really' about physical
306. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (1999).
307. OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 11, at 41-42 ("We must not assume that
models in general and the social model in particular can do everything: that it can
explain disability in totality. It is not a social theory of disability and it cannot do the
work of social theory .... An adequate social theory of disability must contain a theory
of impairment .... So let's develop a social model of impairment to stand alongside a
social model of disability but let's not pretend that either or both are social theory.").
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limitation after all."'30 8 From the perspective of the social model, there are
at least three reasons for the radical break from the medical model by sever-
ing the links between disability and illness. First is to rescue the fate of
persons with disabilities from the conceptual framework of medical exper-
tise that labeled them "patients" in need of help. 30 9 Second is to challenge
unwarranted but widely shared presuppositions of normality. Third, such
a separation would prevent the "dilution" of the class of persons with disa-
bilities and thus clear some of the hurdles in the formation of their com-
mon identity. I take up the third reason in the next section, in which I
discuss the arguments from medical expertise and presuppositions of
normality.
Like most forms of expertise, medical expertise has the tendency to
impose its interpretative code on social contexts that extend beyond its
proper domain. Hence the predicament of disabled individuals under the
reign of medical expertise: "The problem arises when doctors try to use
their knowledge and skill to treat disability rather than illness. Disability
as a long-term social state is not treatable medically and is certainly not
curable. Hence many disabled people experience much medical interven-
tion as, at best, inappropriate, and, at worst, oppressive. '3 10 By placing the
decisional center in the hands of medical professionals and outside the
lives of persons with disabilities, this approach denies the latter's agency
and undercuts their opportunities for self-determination. 3 11 The expert
physician is at the interface between society and persons with disabilities,
denying them "the dignity of risk."'3 12 It is the expert that can assist the
disabled individual to overcome his or her impairment and (re)learn how
to work. The social opportunities of persons with disabilities follow from
the classifications determined by the medical professional. 3 13 If, for
308. See id. at 39 (citing Tom Shakespeare). From this perspective, impairment and
illness should be kept separate. The latter requires medical treatment, impairments
might not. The confusion results from the colonizing tendency of the medical approach.
309. See Scotch, Social Movement, supra note 15, at 162 ("By promoting the image of
disabled people as dependent and in need of professional help, medical and rehabilita-
tion professionals retain control over program beneficiaries at the cost of severely con-
straining the disabled person.").
310. OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 11, at 36. Oliver continues, "[tihis should
not be seen as a personal attack on individual doctors, or indeed the medical profession,
for they, too, are trapped in a set of social relations with which they are not trained or
equipped to deal." Id.
311. MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT 5 (1990) [hereinafter OLIVER,
POLITICS]. "The problem ... is that medical people tend to see all difficulties solely from
the perspective of proposed treatments for a 'patient', without recognising that the indi-
vidual has to weigh up whether this treatment fits into the overall economy of their life."
Id. (quoting Simon Brisenden, Independent Living and the Medical Model of Disability, 1
DISABILITY, HANDICAP & SOC'Y 173, 176 (1986)).
312. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 24, at 26.
313. Since the impairments that befall human beings are the same everywhere, classi-
fication of impairments can transcend national borders and secure the convergence of
technical terms. In the influential 1980 classification of the World Health Organization,
medical expertise becomes the unlikely site of residual cosmopolitanism. It is not sur-
prising that, despite arguments in favor of dispensing with classifications altogether, the
1980 WHO rules were instead modified in the 2001 International Classification of
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instance, the fixation of the spine is at 30 degrees or more from the natural
position, then that person is entitled to cash benefits.3 14 This medicalized
approach has a deep-going social effect because it offers non-disabled
social actors a lens for de-coding situations in ways that legitimize asymme-
tries of social roles. Paternalism, a staple feature of the charity model and
medical approaches, takes root in these social asymmetries that become
taken-for-granted fixtures of the social landscape. 3 15
Underlying the primacy of medical expertise is a certain ideal of nor-
mality as regularity. The task of the doctor is to "restore the disabled per-
son to normality, whatever that means. '3 16 A "normal" life, in this view, is
the kind of life that any rational person would want to live. Conversely, no
one who is rational could want to live with a medical impairment. The
medical expert is therefore available to help the individual become the way
any rational person wants to be.
Because the social model took issue both with claims of medical
expertise and "normality,"3 17 its task became to delink illness from disabil-
ity. The decision not to theorize about medical impairments as part of the
social model was perceived as an integral part of fulfilling that task. While
medical impairments are different from illness, theorizing about impair-
ments would, in the view of social model theorists, reinforce the misunder-
standing that "disability is 'really' about physical limitation after all."'3 18
Failure to theorize about impairments as part of the social model left a
blind spot in the claims of the different disability rights movements. Yet
even when such theorizing did occur as part of a social theory of disability,
acknowledging Abberley's point that "a theory of disability ... then must
offer what is essentially a social theory of impairment,"3 19 those theories
Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF). This is a typical situation of a conflict of
rationalities between, on the one hand, the medical experts who relied on classifications
to structure their understanding and reporting of disease and, on the other hand, disa-
bility rights advocates. See generally Rachel Hurst, Disabled Peoples' International: Europe
and the Social Model of Disability, in THE SOCIAL MODEL OF DISABILITY: EUROPE AND THE
MAJORITY WORLD 67-70 (Colin Barnes & Geof Mercer eds., 2005).
314. But see JERRY L. MASHAW, BURFAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DIsA-
BILITY CLAIMS 52-54 (1985) (noting that although Congress attempted to separate disa-
bility from unemployment, this binary classification is not in fact so absolute; the statute
also makes the claimant's age, education, and work experience independently
significant).
315. See Williams, supra note 10, at 520 (arguing that, for some people with disabili-
ties, "the benevolence of welfare institutions can appear more deadly than the harsh
conditions often encountered in the outside world."). On paternalism, see also Hahn,
supra note 178, at 181-182.
316. OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 11, at 36 ("The whole medical and rehabilita-
tion enterprise is founded upon an ideology of normality and this has far reaching impli-
cations for rehabilitation and treatment. Its aim is to restore the disabled person to
normality, whatever that may mean.").
317. See id. at 36-37 (describing the implications of the ideology of normality as
resulting in the justification of surgical intervention and physical rehabilitation,
whatever its costs in terms of pain and suffering of persons with disabilities).
318. See id. at 39 (quoting Tom Shakespeare, A Response to Liz Crow, COAITION,
1992).
319. OLIVER, POLTCs, supra note 311, at 12.
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were of limited use to political and legal claims. The theories were almost
exclusively dedicated to the cultural production of impairment and disabil-
ity. 3 20 Culture was understood as the culture of groups, by contrast to the
culture of individualism. 3 2 1 The subjective experience of disability was the
only standpoint from which the social problem of disability could be legiti-
mately approached: "A social theory of disability, however, must be located
within the experience of disabled people themselves and their attempts,
not only to redefine disability but also to construct a political movement
amongst themselves and to develop services commensurate with their own
self-defined needs."3 2 2
The problem with this cultural theorizing about impairments is that,
even assuming its soundness on the merits, 323 it fails to distinguish impair-
ment from illness. Much of what it says about the cultural production of
disability and impairments could be said about the cultural production of
illness. This is a problem because distinguishing between impairment and
illness was the task it set out to accomplish. Another problem with this
approach is its reluctance to place itself in a cultural context. The need to
disconnect impairment from illness should itself be understood in a cul-
tural context that shapes self-understanding, public policies, and legal
rules. Culturally speaking, the rise of the social model was closely related
to advancement in medical technologies that allowed individuals to live
longer lives despite illnesses or impairments. 3 24 Similar changes in medi-
cal and non-medical technologies have changed what it means and what it
takes for an individual to be a dependent.3 25 Moreover, in a legal context,
awareness of cultural context might lead one to ask if, for instance, the
asymmetries noted in the medical model can be counter-balanced in a legal
system that recognizes a constitutional right to health.3 26 These elements
of cultural contextualization were often disregarded by theorizing about
medical impairments in the context of a social theory of disability.
However sound the need to delink medical impairment from illness,
social movements were bereft of arguments to invoke in the public sphere-
and notably, in courts of law-regarding the interpretation of impairment
in the definition of disability from the perspective of the social model.
Moreover, as I will show in the next section, the disability rights movement
320. See id. at 12-14.
321. See id. at 11 (discussing "the ways in which disability is 'produced' as an individ-
ual and medical problem within capitalist society.").
322. Id.
323. See Colin Barnes & Geof Mercer, Understanding Impairment and Disability:
Towards an International Perspective, in THE SOCIAL MODEL of DISABILITY: EUROPE AND THE
MAJORITY WORLD 5-6 (Colin Barnes & Geof Mercer eds., 2005).
324. See Scotch, Social Movement, supra note 15, at 164 (discussing how "physical
impairment [became] less handicapping than the barriers of stereotyped attitudes and
architectural constraints.").
325. Monique A. M. Gignac & Cheryl Cott, A Conceptual Model of Independence and
Dependence for Adults with Chronic Physical Illness and Disability, 47 Soc. SCI. MED 739,
748-49 (1998).
326. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 27(1)(a) ("Everyone has the right to have access
to health care services, including reproductive health care.").
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lacked the incentive to correct for this missing account of medical impair-
ments. Yet the concept of medical impairment continued to figure promi-
nently in the definitions of disability, which included chronic health
problems such as high blood pressure or diabetes. 3 27 In the next section, I
show how the lack of guidance on how to interpret the concept of medical
impairment led courts-both in the United States and in Europe - toward a
medicalized approach as a way of quieting their institutional misgivings
about possible abuses of disability statutes.
B. The Disability Rights Movement and the Role of the Judiciary
Let us now take a closer look at the antidiscrimination model and the
significance of enforceable rights as the framework in which the struggle
for recognition of persons with disability was cast both in the United States
and the European Union (as well as gradually in the national politics of the
Member States). Rights- enforceable rights-played a key role in the trans-
formation of disability policy. In this process, the U.S. acted as "an
exporter of disability rights consciousness." 328 From the late 1960s
through the 1990s, the American antidiscrimination regime framed the
horizon of the legal imagination of disability advocates across Europe. But
the importance of rights transcended their strategic use. The idea of
enforceable rights was also deeply embedded in the normative assump-
tions of the social model. The medicalized approach had failed "to take
into account wider aspects of disability,"' 32 9 such as the experiences of dis-
abled persons. An emphasis on rights changes the social status and social
understanding of persons with disabilities from powerless recipients of
their peers' charity to right-holders capable of making demands on the
world. 33
0
Antidiscrimination rights are granted to individuals as a means to
defend them from society's discriminatory reaction to real or perceived,
present or past medical impairments. In the eyes of the law, as well as from
the perspective of the social movement, right-holders belong to a special
protected class of persons with disabilities. However, having a right might
be insufficient for the individuals to see themselves as belonging to the
protected group. This gap between self-understanding, on the one hand,
and the status of belonging to a certain social category, on the other hand,
is particularly significant in the case of persons with disabilities because of
the wide array of medical impairments that triggers social discrimina-
tion.3 3 ' Yet social reform depends on effective political advocacy that itself
327. See data from the U.S. Census Bureau, cited in Weisbach, supra note 17, at 60.
328. Heyer, supra note 31, at 758.
329. OLIVER, POLITICS, supra note 311, at 5.
330. See Scotch, Models, supra note 3, at 216 ("Rights empower people with disabili-
ties. With rights, people with disabilities may legitimately contest what they perceive to
be illegitimate treatment of them." (quoting PAUL C. HIGGINS, MAKING DISABILITY: EXPLOR-
ING THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN VARIATION 199-200 (1992)).
331. See Scotch, Social Movement, supra note 15, at 163 ("'disability' as a unifying
concept that includes people with a wide range of physical and mental impairments is
by no means an obvious category. Blind people, people with orthopedic impairments,
Vol. 44
2011 Impairment, Discrimination, and Disability
turns on the shared consciousness of participants in the social movement.
Unlike with other social groups that struggled for recognition, where such
commonality-on grounds of race, gender, sexual orientation, etc.-could
be more or less taken for granted, the formation of a shared consciousness
of persons with disabilities required that the protected class be carefully
delineated. From this perspective, linking impairments and illness would
expand the ambits of the protected class, dilute the shared political identity
of the class members, and delay, perhaps sine die, political emancipation.
From the perspective of the social movements, allowing persons who are ill
to receive disability protection would undermine the conditions for the
development of a collective consciousness that could support effective
political action. This idea of a special class, a group, was central to the
architecture of the social model. 33 2 From within that model, the transition
from the medical to the social approach brought with it a shift from an
individual approach to a group perspective. At the very core of the social
model, at least in its early formulations, was the need for a "process of
empowerment of disabled people as a group" by contrast to the individual-
ized assessment of the medicalized approach.3 33 Implied in this shift is the
acceptance of a binary approach to disability (including a categorical con-
ception of dependence/independence 33 4 ), and conversely, a rejection of
the view that it is best to conceptualize disability along a continuum.3 35 It
is thus apparent how this political strategy shaped the core claims of the
social model, particularly the lack of theorizing about medical impair-
ments. From this perspective, the ECJ's refusal to extend the Directive's
protection to cover Navas's illness was correct. The social model provides
counter-arguments to the position of the Madrid Labor Court, the referring
court in Navas, to the effect that "a worker should ... be protected as soon
as the sickness is established. '3 3
6
The concerns of the judiciary are different from the formation of
shared identity of persons with disabilities. Courts see themselves as
and people with epilepsy may not inherently see themselves or be seen by others as
occupying common ground. Even greater divisions may exist between individuals with
physical impairments and those with mental disabilities. Thus another prerequisite for
collective action may be the social construction and promulgation of an inclusive defini-
tion of disability.").
332. As always in these situations, there is a risk of essentializing the traits that
delimit the protected class. See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR
CIVIL RIGHTS 191 (2006) ("the liberty paradigm [protects] the authentic self better than
the equality paradigm. While it need not do so, the equality paradigm is prone to essen-
tializing the identities it protects.").
333. OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 11, at 37.
334. For a critique, see Gignac & Cott, supra note 325.
335. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 10, at 522. On the subordination approach, as
contrasted with competing alternatives, see Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 65, at
445-84.
336. See Opinion of Advoc. Gen. Geelhoed, Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, 9 27. But see
European Disability Forum, EDF Analysis, supra note 164, at 8 (arguing that the differ-
ence between disability and illness is quantitative, and that any illness that has long-
term effects (such as heart disease, diabetes, asthma, depression) constitutes a
disability).
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entrusted with the interpretation and application of statutes in a clear,
rational, and administrable fashion. I will refer to these as the judiciary's
institutional self-understanding. If adjudication is understood as line-
drawing and line-policing, then the question of preventing abuse becomes
a central concern. 33 7 Courts cannot fulfill their institutional task without
filtering out abusive claims. In order to do this, judges must draw and
enforce the boundaries of the group of persons to whom the law grants
special entitlements. How they draw those boundaries will have an impact
on the formation of political consciousness, yet that impact is not likely to
be a concern of the judiciary. The stakes in the definition of disability are
a function of its far-reaching implications for both courts and the social
movement, albeit for different reasons.3 38 Because of these high stakes, the
definition of disability has become the battleground of different
approaches. 339
These institutional concerns explain why courts interpreted the con-
cept of impairments according to a medicalized approach, while at the
same time refusing to extend disability protection to any person who was
discriminated against because of illness. Consider for now this second
issue. Although the determination of this issue arose differently in the ECJ
as compared to the American courts, with the ECJ stipulating a definition
in Navas and American courts interpreting the statutory definition of disa-
bility, American law takes a similar position as that of the Navas court.
That is, American courts declined to protect discrimination based on ill-
ness under the disability heading. For instance, in Christian v. St. Anthony
Medical Center, Inc., the plaintiff argued that the ADA protects an employee
from being fired because of an illness.3 40 The court held, unequivocally,
that it does not.34 1 Likewise, in Rodriguez v. Loctite Puerto Rico, Inc., judges
337. For an attempt to deconstruct the layers of argument about social structure in
antidiscrimination law, see generally Emens, supra note 247.
338. Harlan Hahn has criticized courts for their failure to adopt a minority group
model of disability based on the social model. See Hahn, supra note 178, at 176 ("The
sociopolitical definition [of disability] is the foundation of the minority group model of
disability which contends that disabled Americans are entitled to the same legal and
constitutional protection as other disadvantaged groups."). Hahn has developed the
minority group model in Harlan Hahn, The Minority Group Model of Disability: Implica-
tions for Medical Sociology, in 11 RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH CARE 3 (Rose
Welt &JeanneJ. Kronenfield eds., 1994). As I argue in this section, I do not believe that
Hahn is right in arguing that courts have failed to adopt a minority group model. In fact,
the court's turn back to a narrow definition of disability has arisen precisely because
judges operated within that framework.
339. See, e.g., Scotch, Social Movement, supra note 15; see also BAGENSTOS, supra note
24, at 45 ("Passing judgment on the Supreme Court's definition-of-disability decisions
... entails passing judgment on the strategies and ideals of disability movement activists
themselves.").
340. See 117 F.3d 1051, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1997).
341. See id. at 1053 ("The Act is not a general protection of medically afflicted per-
sons ... [ijf the employer discriminates against them on account of their being (or being
believed by him to be) ill, even permanently ill, but not disabled, there is no violation.");
see also Bridges, 92 F.3d 329 (affirming judgment for employer where plaintiff was dis-
qualified from being a firefighter based on his hemophilia because hemophilia is not a
disability per se and the field of firefighting jobs was so narrow that plaintiff was not
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found as a matter of law that the plaintiff - who allegedly suffered from
Lupus - was not disabled under the ADA because the illness did not limit
any of her major life functions. 3 42 The court explained, "An illness cannot
in and of itself be considered an impairment. Only its symptoms and/or
ramifications actually limit the inflicted person's ability to perform major
life activities. '3 43 .
Institutional concerns are so deeply embedded in their legal rational-
ity that they regularly surface in judicial decisions. When the ECJ in Navas
stated that "[tlhere is nothing in Directive 2000/78 to suggest that workers
are protected by the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability
as soon'as they develop any type of sickness,"344 what it indicates is its fear
that plaintiffs with trivial and transitory conditions will abuse the Direc-
tive. In the Sutton context, fears of abuse were compounded by the factual
context of the case, which referred to a very common medical condition of
suboptimal vision.34 5 Commentators have pointed out that the facts in
this case were less than ideal as a vehicle for getting a statement of princi-
ple on the first prong of the definition of disability. Other legal systems, for
instance the UK's, have excluded eyeglasses or contact lenses, understood
as corrective measures for suboptimal vision, from disability protection. 34 6
One can therefore see how this very common measure-correcting subop-
timal vision -might have initially obscured the far-reaching implications of
denying ADA protection to individuals that applied corrective measures to
their impairments.
Administrability is also a part of courts' concerns with dispensing
their institutional task. The dissenters in Sutton noted the majority's con-
cern with "the tidal waves of lawsuits"'3 47 that presumably would have fol-
lowed from authorizing plaintiffs to bring claims despite the alleviating
effects of measures that mitigate their impairment. These are familiar insti-
tutional concerns with the administrability of judicially-produced stan-
dards. This administrability is connected to the idea of formal equality,
that all cases must be treated alike.
There was little to answer courts' institutional concerns that a social
model, effect-based interpretation of disability would not make it impossi-
ble to identify and weed out abusive claims. With no other anchors within
substantially limited in the major life activity of working). For a discussion of the tort-
based public policy exception to the at-will doctrine available under state law to employ-
ees fired for absenteeism due to temporary total disability, see Seth J. Hanft, Creating a
Public Policy Exception for Absenteeism Due to Temporary Total Disability: Common Law or
Codification?, 77 U. CIN. L. REv. 655 (2008).
342. 967 F. Supp. 653, 659 (D. Puerto Rico, 1997).
343. Id.
344. Chacon Navas, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467, ' 46.
345. 527 U.S. at 475. To be fair, the severe myopia only affected 2% of the popula-
tion. See id. at 507 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
346. See COLKER, supra note 79, at 105 (citing Nick Wenbourne, Disabled Meanings: A
Comparison of the Definitions of 'Disability' in the British Disability Discrimination Act of
1995 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
149 (1999)).
347. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 508 (Stevens J., dissenting).
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reach (societal attitudes or health condition, illness, etc), judges relied on
the concept of medical impairment, understood in a narrow, medicalized
way, in drawing the boundaries of the class of persons to whom disability
statutes apply. Developing a theoretical account of medical impairments
would have been a sine qua non condition for operationalizing the social
model for the use of courts. The tension between the judiciary's concerns
and the aims of the disability movement provides the additional explana-
tion that none of the factors discussed above-doctrine, interpretation, the
jurisprudence of equality, sociology of the legal professions, institutional
structure, or ideology-could capture satisfactorily.
The explanation proposed above does not seek to justify courts'
approaches to the definition of disability. Put differently, the reaction of
courts is understandable, but not-or not necessarily348-justified. The
question of justification depends on one's conception of the institutional
role of courts. Consider for instance the asymmetry in the social roles of
judges and disability advocates. One can start from observing this asym-
metry and construct a view of the judiciary's role whereby judges should
anticipate and remedy the self-inflicted distortions of the kind that have led
the disability rights movement to specific legal constructions of disabil-
ity.34 9 Leaving medical impairments under-theorized was such a distor-
tion effect that occurred in the process of translating the insights of the
social model into public policy and legal claims. If one believes that courts
are under a duty of responsiveness, then the narrow, medicalized defini-
tion of disability represents a failure of responsiveness on the part of
courts.
This approach has important implications de lege ferenda. At least at a
formal level, the lessons would be easier to implement in the EU where the
path dependency in the definition of disability is less severe than in the US.
For instance, proposals for a new Equal Treatment Directive mention the
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities as "guidance" in
defining the concept of disability. In the US, the 2008 ADAAA represents
Congress' wish to restore the initial aims of the ADA, but leaves the defini-
tion of disability intact and fails to give courts definitive guidance on how
to interpret the concept of medical impairments. 350 One effect will be that
ADA litigation will be channeled toward the "regarded as" prong in the
hope of steering away from definitional disputes. While many anticipate
348. Some disability law scholars have forcefully argued against attempts to separate
description from justification. See Martha T. McCluskey, How the Biological/Social
Divide Limits Disability and Equality, 33 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 109, 112 (2010) ("In the
case of disability, as with gender, the positivist inquiry into what the relevant difference
is cannot be separated from the normative inquiry into what the relevant difference
should be.").
349. Constructing such an institutional account of the role of courts goes beyond the
aim of this paper. I have sketched out such an approach in Vtad Perju, Cosmopolitanism
and Constitutional Self-Government, 8 INTLJ. CONST. L. 326 (2010).
350. For an example of recent case where courts operated the interpretative shift dic-
tated by Congress in the ADAAA, see Gil v. Vortex, LLC, 697 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass.
2010).
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that this is the likely development in the foreseeable future, institutional
concerns with administrability will sooner or later lead judges to seek
objective grounds for their decisions and thus revert back to the defini-
tional analysis.
Another option, in both the EU and the US, would be to do away with
a reference to medical impairments in the definitions of disability. Yet it is
unlikely that such a proposal would be realistically accepted. There is a
path dependency in how concepts are defined, and medical impairments
have been so much at the center of the meaning of disability that it might
be difficult to radically shift course at this stage. A more moderate propo-
sal would encapsulate the lessons of the past and have greater chances for
success. Specifically, the new approach would define disability as the
social effect of real or perceived medical impairments. Such a definition
would shift judicial analysis away from the nature of the medical impair-
ments and towards the discriminatory social effects. This may not be the
guidance that judges needed all along, but it would be a step in the right
direction.
Conclusion
Proposals for future reforms in disability law reform depend on first
facing the legacy of the past. This Article has cast that legacy in a different
light. Using a comparative framework, I have argued that distortion effects
in the formulation of claims rooted in the social model are a previously
overlooked factor that explains in part the resilience of the medicalized
model in judicial definitions of disability. I have made this argument by
first identifying a synchronized evolution of disability law in Europe and
the United States. This synchronization was the effect of the social model
of disability on the legal and political cultures of both jurisdictions, as well
as of the cross-influence of disability rights movements. One aspect of the
synchronization is the presence of narrow judicial interpretations of disa-
bility in both the EU and the U.S. These interpretations drastically limited
the class of intended beneficiaries of legislation aimed at implementing a
discrimination based approach to disability. While American scholarship
has investigated at great length the decisions of U.S. courts, scholars have
rarely looked across the Atlantic in order to gain a new perspective on the
state of affairs in American disability law. I argued that the social model
itself must be included-alongside ideology, text, doctrine, institutional
structure, or professional consciousness-in the explanation of the judici-
ary's narrow interpretations. Specifically, I have examined the interplay
between, on the one hand, the social model's conceptualization of illness,
impairment, and disability, and on the other hand, the broader argumenta-
tive strategies that the disability rights movement deployed in its struggle
for recognition of the equal status of persons with disabilities. The conflu-
ence of these two factors explains the failure to conceptualize medical
impairments, to which I referred as a distortion effect in the translation of
the insights of the social model into public policy and legal claims. Thus,
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the decision to leave medical impairments under-theorized was the
response of social model theorists to the perceived risk that an analogy
between impairments and illness would legitimize the dominion of medical
expertise, and that it would perpetuate socially disabling assumptions
about normality. These distortion effects left courts bereft of guidance on
the social model interpretation of disability and made them seek refuge in
the more familiar territory of the medicalized approach. Narrow judicial
interpretations of disability are the answer to how judges, consumed by
institutional concerns with the administrability of potentially sweeping dis-
ability statutes, reacted to the fears of social movements that only a strong
social discrimination approach could create the shared political conscious-
ness necessary for reform. I offered this answer as an explanation, not a
justification, of the work of courts in both the EU and the US. This broad,
comparative approach puts the struggle for recognition of persons with dis-
abilities in a new light.
